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Cao: Ethnic Economies, Cultural Resources, and the African American Qu

ETHNIC ECONOMIES, CULTURAL RESOURCES, AND THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN QUESTION
Lan Cao*

Ethnic economies are complex. Scholars have debated their many
facets, starting with basic questions like how and why they are formed to
the thornier philosophical issues surrounding their establishment and
functioning.1. At its core, ethnic economies depend on the creation of an
in-group, which conversely, means drawing a line that distinguishes
between insiders and outsiders. Because culture constitutes a core element
of the ethnic economy, one of the major controversies revolves around
cultural issues – cultural inclusion, cultural exclusion, the existence of
cultural resources, and the group’s ability to marshal social or cultural
capital for individual and community advancement
Scholars in many fields have debated the role of law and institutions
versus that of cultural norms conducive to economic development. 2
With respect to ethnic economies, sociologists have dominated the
literature which has only recently captured the interest of economists
and law and development scholars. The sociological literature has
focused on ethnic minorities and immigrants who turned economically
inward due to external hostility;3 and as discussed in this article,
paradoxically, has not paid much attention to African Americans, a
group historically subjected to intense discrimination in the United
States. The reason for this neglect, this article argues, could be found
in assumptions about lack of African American cultural norms or
absence of cultural cohesion needed to support the establishment of
African American ethnic economies. To the extent that scholars have
addressed African American entrepreneurship, the question “has been
about the causes of apparent [B]lack under-representation in selfemployment, an implicit racialization in scholarly discourse which
arguably parallels prevalent common-sense notions about cultural
pathology.”4
* The author would like to thank Professor Felix Chang for his invitation to participate in the symposium
and the editors of the Cincinnati Law Review for their hard work and insightful edit of this article.
1. See generally Antoine Pecoud, Thinking and Rethinking Ethnic Economies, 9 DIASPORA J.
TRANSNAT’L STUDS. 439 (2000).
2. See generally LAN CAO, CULTURE IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: NURTURING POSITIVE
CHANGE 1-68 (2015)
3. See generally Antoine Pecoud, What is Ethnic in an Ethnic Economy?, 20 INT’L REV. SOCIO.
59 (2010).
4. Dipannita Basu & Pnina Werbner, Bootstrap Capitalism and the Culture Industries: A Critique
of Invidious Comparisons In The Study of Ethnic Entrepreneurship, 24 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUDS. 236,
236 (2001).
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This article disputes those assumptions and is a step towards filling the
gap in the ethnic economy literature concerning the African American
experience.
Simply put, ethnic economies are economies that are made up of
ethnics who are either self-employed or employ other co-ethnics. These
are also referred to as ethnic ownership economies,5 although there are
variants discussed below. They are a job-creating mechanism that relies
on the ethnic community for labor and capital instead of on the general
labor force or the wider society. Ethnic economies operate more like
traditional or primitive capitalism because exchanges are based on ingroup co-ethnic relationships or “communalism.”6 Hence, a key feature
of traditional capitalism is its personalistic foundation placing it outside
the norm of modern capitalism, which functions in an impersonalistic
manner because transactions are not dependent on in-group exchanges but
rather, on the mechanisms of contract law for the formation and
enforcement of the deal.7
Historically, marginal traders, such as middlemen minorities living in
the diasporas and facing hostility, had little choice but to rely on
personalistic resources to establish ethnic economies.8 Although hostility,
exclusion, and discrimination faced in the host country are catalyzing
factors in the formation of ethnic economies, scholarship on ethnic
economies focuses on the second part of the equation (the development
of ethnic enterprises and their characteristics), and leaves the first part of
the equation (racism and discrimination) unexplored. Jews were
considered the quintessential middlemen minorities, but there were also
other middlemen minorities historically, such as the overseas Chinese, the
Sikhs in East Africa, the Parsees or Marwaris of India, Ismaili Muslims,
Hausas of Nigeria. 9 It was also assumed that middlemen minorities and
their ethnic economies thrived only in “backward” societies devoid of
modern rules and that they would dwindle away as precapitalist societies

5. IVAN LIGHT & STEPHEN J. GOLD, ETHNIC ECONOMIES 4, 27 (2000); see also EDNA BONACICH
& JOHN MODELL, THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF ETHNIC SOLIDARITY (1980).
6. BONACICH & MODELL, supra note 5, at 1; LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, at 4-5.
7. Lan Cao, Looking At Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 858 n 53 and
n. 54 (1999); Kevin Davis et al., Ethnically Homogeneous Commercial Elites in Developing Countries,
32 LAW & POL’Y OF INT’L BUS. 332-33 (2001); H.H. GERTH & C. WRIGHT MILLS, FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 189, 215 (1958); WERNER SOMBART, THE JEWS AND MODERN CAPITALISM 33
(1953). MAX WEBER, BASIC CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY 109, 251-52 (1969).
8. BONACICH & MODELL, supra note 5, at 19, 13-14. Bonacich & Modell describe the three ways
middleman minorities can be conceptualized – (1) as buffers between elites and non-elites; (2) as
economic middlemen concentrated in trade and commerce who are go-betweens between producers and
consumers; and (3) as traders in small business often referred to as petit bourgeois as opposed to capitalist
major entrepreneurs; see also LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, at 6.
9. BONACICH & MODELL, supra note 5, at 14 (1980); LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, at 6.
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give way to modern capitalist ones. 10 Indeed, eminent sociologist Clifford
Geertz characterized certain institutions that are vital for capital and credit
needed to establish ethnic economies, such as the rotating credit
association, as but a mere “middle rung in development” that would
presumably phase out when modernity (in the form of financial
institutions such as banks) is achieved in development’s higher rungs.11
Yet, ethnic economies, whose theoretical underpinnings are rooted in
the Third World context, have remained an established presence in
Western developed countries. Moreover, not only are modes of traditional
capitalism found in modern capitalist economies, but they have also
expanded beyond the historically dominant ethnic trading groups
mentioned above. Thus, the emergence of ethnic economies established
by Cubans, Koreans, Vietnamese, West Indians and others who do not
have a middleman tradition is not expected by ethnic economy scholars.
Two principal features characterize today’s ethnic economies. First, as
this article demonstrates, primitive capitalism has not died out but rather,
has continued in various pockets in advanced capitalist countries. Second,
ethnic economies are not confined only to those formed by middlemen
minorities but have expanded to include those with no such middlemen
connection. This means that ethnic economies are now associated in
developed countries such as the United States with ethnic minorities who
are also immigrants with no historical middleman predilection.
Consequently, underlying the complexity is one of the central issues of
ethnic economies that this article returns to – the issue of the ethnic
boundary. Because ethnic economies in the United States are associated
with immigrants and ethnic minorities, they evoke questions about
identity itself; that is, immigrant and outsider, relegated to separate
economic spheres or American and insider, incorporated into the
mainstream labor force.
In other words, intrinsic within ethnic economies are the notions of
boundaries and separateness. Immigrant separateness from the
mainstream society is a particularly distinctive type of separateness;
separateness from the country of emigration, causing them to be
10. See generally Amy Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Towards A New Paradigm for
Law and Development, 108 YALE L. J. 1, 12 (1998) (describing the assumption in law and development
that Western rules would supplant Third World “localism.”); Lan Cao, The Ethnic Question in Law and
Development, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1044, 1060 (2004) (discussing ethnic economies and traditional
capitalism). The German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies discussed the transition towards modernity as one
that involved the transformation of communities, Gemeinschaft, entrenched in traditional norms and
personal relationships, to societies, Gesellschaft, defined by a weakening of personal bonds and a
strengthening
of
impersonal
rules.
Gemeinschaft
and
Gesellschaft,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Gemeinschaft-and-Gesellschaft. See also EDNA BONACICH & JOHN
MODELL, THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF ETHNIC SOLIDARITY 1 (1980)
11. Clifford Geertz, The Rotating Credit Association; A “Middle Rung” in Development, 10 ECON.
DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 241, 241(1962).
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uninterested in local politics12 and “highly solidary within their own
ethnic group”13 and at the same time retaining connection with the
homeland for some period of time. This “tie to the homeland is expressed
in a number of ways, including the leaving behind of family members, the
sending of remittances, and occasional visits.”14 This separateness
element is also often expressed in the provision of goods distinctly
associated with the ethnic or immigrant group’s identity; consequently,
the associated ethnic economy is likely to be engaged in “selling packaged
culture.”15
Consequently, ethnic economies implicate a number of contested
issues that continue to dominate the political and economic development
debate such as economic self-help through ethnic solidarity and cultural
cohesion. Ethnic economies thus represent a path starkly different from
the path of integration, equality, and civil rights. In other words, ethnic
economies involve, by definition, a clustering of economic activities
centered on ethnic commonalities as a buffer against wider external
hostility. In the United States, for example, despite being a professed
country of immigrants, certain immigrant groups such as Asian and Arab
Americans have suffered from a history of “de-Americanization,” that is,
being deemed foreign and not-American regardless of their own
identity.16 Ethnic economies preach ethnic inclusion as a reaction against
the wider society and also ethnic exclusion of non-co-ethnics.
As a result, a discussion of ethnic economies, at least in the United
States, tends to evoke a powerful undercurrent or subtext and that is:
where are African Americans in ethnic economies? In other words,
because the scholarship on ethnic economies has excluded African
Americans, one is left with the impression that African Americans had no
ethnic economies when the contrary is true, as this article will show.While
this might be a perfectly fine inquiry if asked in a scholarly rather than a
politically or ideologically motivated way; there is a subtext, a selfcongratulatory undertone which purports to celebrate ethnic pluralism and
ethnic self-help while simultaneously condemning African Americans for
not replicating the same “formula for success” that other ethnic minority
immigrants have adhered to.17 For example, “[B]lacks in America are said
12. BONACICH & MODELL, supra note 5, at 16.
13. Id. at 15.
14. Id.
15. Basu & Werbner, supra note 4, at 241. Immigrants have specialized in selling their home
country products especially in the food and garment industries; African Americans in recent years have
been spectacularly successful in the creation of a niche that specializes in culture industries. Id.
16. Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of Immigrant America, 7 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 441, 443-45 (2002).
17. As some critics have noted, when discussion touched on African American business history,
comparisons are usually made to immigrants and the “results are invariably invidious, compounding as

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol91/iss2/1

4

Cao: Ethnic Economies, Cultural Resources, and the African American Qu

2022]

ETHNIC ECONOMIES

307

to lack distinct cultural resources that might constitute the springboard for
the creation of a [B]lack ethnic economy.”18 By contrast, the depiction of
Asian Americans as the “model minority” emerged out of a particular
historical context to serve a political agenda whereby the United States
can be viewed as being free or relatively free of structural racism and as
a result, racial minorities who remain at the bottom rungs of the economic
ladder are to blame. This depiction also pits one minority group against
another whereby one is deemed to have the right cultural traits, in this
case, for economic self-help and the other is not. This subtext has become
even more pronounced in recent years given the economic successes of
African immigrants who are both outsider immigrant and African in
origin. Yet, as this article argues, African Americans have also had their
version of ethnic economies which has been overlooked for various
reasons.19
Section I of this article discusses the primary features of ethnic
economies, whether established by middleman minorities or by recent
immigrants and minorities. Because one of the key features is cultural or
social capital and how it is leveraged for in-group benefits, the culture
argument has been rippling beneath the surface of the discussion, leaving
open the cultural question as it applies to African Americans. This Section
also connects the use of ethnic economies as a weapon to artificially
inflate immigrants, especially Asians, as the “model minority” as a wedge
issue against other racial minorities. There is a disturbing cultural subtext
which operates to suggest that immigrant groups (but not African
Americans) have cultural resources that support their ethnic economies
for in-group success.
Section II examines African American attempts to establish their own
separate economies, following the model favored by Booker T.
Washington, to achieve self-help. Here, parallels can be drawn between
the immigrant and African American ethnic economy experience –
outsider and separateness on the one hand as well as preservation and
marshalling of cultural resources and solidarity for individual and group
self-help on the other hand. Section II demonstrates that despite the
glaring omission of the African American experience from much of the
literature on ethnic economies, African Americans have a long history in
the United States of entrepreneurship emerging from and supported by
they do multiple descriptions by negation.” Basu & Werbner, supra note 4, at 238 (“black business
achievements are defined negatively,” whereas immigrant businesses, of “Jews, Italians, Greeks,
Japanese, Chinese, Cubans, [and] Koreans . . . have elicited a lively debate on the causes of their success”).
18. Id. at 237.
19. Some have argued that “arguments about black failure stem from the fallacy of invisibility.
Black ethnic enclave economies are not marked by spatial concentrations. This is partly because African
American entrepreneurs have been less inclined than other groups to enter conventional ethnic industries
such as clothing or food.” Id. at 241.
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community cultural resources akin to that of ethnic immigrants and their
ethnic economies. It is all the more curious, therefore, that the literature
on ethnic entrepreneurship either ignores the Black experience or
“stresses the failure of African Americans to enhance their status and
wealth through self-employment and their under-representation in the
ranks of small businessmen.”20
I.

ETHNIC ECONOMIES AND THEIR VARIANTS

Historically, certain immigrants have excelled in the small trade
business when they emigrated from their homeland. The conundrum of
why some have excelled more than others caused Max Weber to ponder
why Catholics in Germany have a lower rate of business and
entrepreneurial activities than others, especially given the reality that
subordinated and excluded minorities tend to turn to economic enterprises
given the dearth of choice in the mainstream. 21 For Weber, the
explanation lies in the Protestant ethic which encourages engagement
with the secular world, including trade, leading to the accumulation of
wealth through business. Werner Sombart later replaced Protestantism
with Judaism, attributing the ethics of modern capitalism to the teachings
of Judaism.22
Over time, an area of scholarship that centers around entrepreneurship,
ethnicity, and group attributes developed. How do minority ethnic
immigrants overcome hostility to create businesses for themselves and the
group and “create success out of hate?”23 Such immigrants are commonly
referred to as middleman minorities24 who ensure economic stability for
themselves by occupying the middleman position within capitalism,
ensconced as they usually are as money lender, rent collector, broker, or
by being the bridge between producer and consumer, owner and renter,
elites and masses, etc.25 They tend to maintain strong ties to their
homeland, through return visits and monetary remittances, even as they
position themselves separately from the mainstream society, partly due to
differences in culture and ethnicity and even race.26 They are sojourners,
whose migration is intended, at least initially, to be temporary, and
therefore their objective is to save the capital they generate, instead of
20. Id. at 236-37.
21. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 43 (Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1930).
22. WERNER SOMBART, THE JEWS AND MODERN CAPITALISM 11-21 (1951).
23. Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Middleman Minorities, 38 AM. SOCIO. REV. 583, 584 (1972).
24. Jonathan H. Turner & Edna Bonacich, Toward a Composite Theory of Middleman Minorities,
7 ETHNICITY 144 (1980).
25. Bonacich, supra note 23, at 583.
26. BONACICH & MODELL, supra note 5, at 15.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol91/iss2/1

6

Cao: Ethnic Economies, Cultural Resources, and the African American Qu

2022]

ETHNIC ECONOMIES

309

enjoying the good life in the new country.27
Separateness is solidified through the retention of home country
cultural practices and tradition, such as ancestor worship, insistence on
in-group marriage, the establishment of their own schools for offspring,
voluntary associations based on common clan groups, and self-help
organizations to insulate themselves from having to resort to outside
charity.28 For purposes of this article, separateness is possible
economically through thriving ethnic economies.29 Faced with hostility in
the new country, newcomers turn inward, reinforcing separation and
exclusion from the mainstream. Middleman minorities create their own
economies, relying on family members or co-ethnics for labor, thus
reducing their own labor costs, creating friction with the host labor force
concerned with depressed wages in the process.30 For example, Japanese
cobblers, restaurateurs, and farmers were attacked because other laborers
were resentful of Japanese competition in the market.31 Staying with the
Japanese model, even after WWII internment, the Japanese regrouped and
achieved remarkable economic success.
As a journalist commented,
Barely more than 20 years after the end of the wartime camps, this is a
minority that has risen above even prejudiced criticism. By any criterion of
good citizenship that we choose, the Japanese Americans are better than
any other group in our society, including native-born whites. They have
established this remarkable record, moreover, by their own almost totally
unaided effort. Every attempt to hamper their progress resulted only in
enhancing their determination to succeed. Even in a country whose patron
saint is the Horatio Alger hero, there is no parallel to this success story.32

The middleman minority theory explains Japanese economic success as
the Japanese ethnic economy constitutes the classic example of
middleman minority – one whose historical experience shows strong
group solidarity, discrimination and exclusion and a strong homeland

27. Bonacich, supra note 23, at 584.
28. BONACICH & MODELL, supra note 5, at 15-16.
29. An ethnic economy is an economy of “co-ethnic self-employed and employers and their coethnic employees.” LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, at 4. Whether buyers and sellers are of the same ethnicity
is not relevant for the definition. Id. at 10.
30. Bonacich, supra note 23, at 591; see also John Modell, Class or Ethnic Solidarity: The
Japanese American Company Union, 38 PAC. HIST. REV. 193, 193-206 (1969). For a discussion of
systemic hostility and discrimination against the Japanese in the West Coast of the United States by
European laborers, see JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-HELP AMONG BLACK
AMERICANS: A RECONSIDERATION OF RACE AND ECONOMICS 11 (2005).
31. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 11.
32. William Peterson, Success Story, Japanese American Style, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 1966),
https://www.nytimes.com/1966/01/09/archives/success-story-japaneseamerican-style-success-storyjapaneseamerican.html.
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orientation.33
The success of ethnic economies for certain immigrant groups has
certainly upended longstanding assumptions. For example, it had been
assumed, given the prevalence of assimilation as the preferred route for
newcomers, that wage-earning work in the economic mainstream
provides better opportunities than work in the ethnic economy. 34 Dual
labor market theory, which was developed in the 1960s to explain
continued pattern of unemployment inequality in women and minorities,
posits that those marginal groups remain economically marginalized
because they were stuck in segregated, secondary markets with fewer
avenues for advancement. 35 Compare the secondary market with the
primary market: the former is characterized by stable working conditions,
high wages, higher skills requirements, higher returns on investment and
the latter is characterized by instability and high turnover rates, low skills
and wages and lower returns.36 While that characterization is indeed
accurate, the analysis provided by dual labor market theory did not take
into account self-employment in general or self-employment in ethnic
economies where it is quite prevalent.37 Some ethnic groups, such as the
Japanese, relied heavily on ethnic economies for their livelihood. For
example, in 1941, 56.2% of Japanese American men and 44.4% of
Japanese American women worked in the Japanese ethnic economy. 38 In
the more recent past, 80% of Israelis and 47.5% of Koreans in Los
Angeles were self-employed, with 27.6% of Koreans being employees of
the Korean business owners.39 For Iranians, 56.7% were self-employed;
however, if this group were further disaggregated, the percentage is even
higher, with 81.9% of Iranian Jews and 46.1% of Iranian Muslims being
self-employed, each employing 3.9% and 3.3% of co-ethnics,
respectively. 40 While dual labor market theory is correct for identifying
the existence of multiple segmented markets, it only captures part of the
picture because it did not take into account ethnic economies.
But immigrants also have other escape valves besides selfemployment. Scholars espousing what is referred to as the immigrant, or
ethnic enclave, theory, which studies the employment of immigrant
33. BONACICH & MODELL, supra note 5, at 34.
34. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, at 11.
35. William T. Dickens and Kevin Lang, A Test of Dual Labor Market Theory, 75 AM. ECON.
REV. 792, 802 (1985); Robert L. Kaufman, A Structural Decomposition of Black-White Earnings
Differentials, 89 AM J. SOC. 585, 601-03 (1983). Christine Siegwarth Meyer and Swati Mukerjee,
Investigating Dual Labor Market Theory for Women, 33 EASTERN ECON. J. 301 (2007).
36. Id. at 12; see generally ROBERT T. AVERITT, THE DUAL ECONOMY: THE DYNAMICS OF
AMERICAN INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1968).
37. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, at 11.
38. Id. at 28-29.
39. Id. at 29.
40. Id. at 29-30.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol91/iss2/1

8

Cao: Ethnic Economies, Cultural Resources, and the African American Qu

2022]

ETHNIC ECONOMIES

311

workers in the enclave labor market explains how immigrant workers
have managed to escape the secondary market to find employment in the
alternative immigrant enclave.41 Succinctly stated, “[e]thnic enclave
theory introduces the idea of labor markets when studying ethnic
communities.”42 Thus, immigrant workers working in the secondary
market are not trapped (as presumably mainstream workers are) but have
an escape valve in the sub-economy of immigrant enclave. Indeed, one of
the benefits of enclaves is a safeguard against discrimination in the
mainstream labor market.43 Although there are critics who, for example,
argue that enclaves are exploitative and rely on coercive sweatshop-like
conditions, or that they consist of mostly entrepreneurs and owners who
benefit rather than their workers who are additionally overwhelmed by
the web of obligations and duties owed to co-ethnics;44 for the most part,
there is sufficient evidence that for many immigrants, the enclave is an
aid rather than an impediment.45 Indeed, other studies have found that
focusing primarily on employee wages misses the whole picture; for
example, what might be viewed as “exploitative” and “sweatshop”
conditions can also be viewed as an apprenticeship where ethnics learn
the trade before setting up their own ventures. 46
As the enclave labor market theory was later expanded to include not
just ethnic workers but also the self-employed,47 proponents of the theory
also studied how the enclave maximized economic benefits for coethnics. The discourse on ethnic economies has begun to emphasize the
organizational structure of ethnic businesses. 48 Wilson and Portes found
that superior advantages along co-ethnic lines are possible through
vertical and horizontal integration so that “co-ethnic firms could suck
value out of each stage of a product’s movement toward the market, losing
41. Id. at 12-13. See generally Kenneth L. Wilson & Alejandro Portes, Immigrant Enclaves: An
Analysis of the Labor Market Experiences of Cubans in Miami, 86 AM. J. SOCIO. 295 (1980).
42. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 39.
43. Wilson & Portes, supra note 41, at 295.
44. Jimmy M. Sanders & Victor Nee, Limits of Ethnic Solidarity in the Enclave Economy, 52 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 745 (1987); see also Ethnic Enclave, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/
social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-magazines/ethnic-enclave (last visited Nov. 21, 2022).
45. See generally Yu Xi & Margaret Geogh, Ethnic Enclaves and the Earnings of Immigrants, 48
DEMOGRAPHY 1293 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3226926/.
46. Roger Waldinger, The Ethnic Enclave Debate Revisited, 17 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L RSCH. 444
(1993). Furthermore,
[w]hereas in the secondary, casual labour market wages and job satisfaction were low, this was
not the case for employees in the ethnic enclave, even when their jobs were unskilled and menial,
and their initial wages relatively low, and even if the firms they worked for could be classed as
part of the secondary sector.
Pnina Webner, Metaphors of Spatiality and Networks in the Plural City: A Critique of the Ethnic Enclave
Economy Debate, 35 SOCIOLOGY 671, 676 (2001).
47. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, at 13.
48. Basu & Werbner, supra note 4, at 239.
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little to no value to non-co-ethnic firms.”49 Because the enclave is
“spatially bounded from the main economy so that it can function
internally as a labor market”50 and because such internal labor market is
itself interconnected through common “human capital skills, such as
ethnic language, cultural knowledge, and social network ties to the place
of origin,”51 ethnic linkages make it possible to keep as much of the
capital used as possible within the enclave. For example, studies have
shown that Cuban firms in Miami bought from and sold to each other,
purchasing semi-finished products from Cuban firms, worked on them,
resold the reworked products to other Cuban firms which then sold them
to retail customers.52 The high level of vertical integration in the Cuban
construction industry in Miami allows such firms to draw on their coethnic service sector.53 A similar phenomenon can be found among Italian
firms operating in or near Fisherman’s Wharf area of San Francisco, with
Italian fishermen selling their fish to Italian restaurants which then sell
them to tourist customers. 54 Japanese market gardeners in California also
act as suppliers for Japanese vegetable market wholesalers, who rely on
Japanese truckers to ship their products to a distribution network of
Japanese greengrocers. 55 Because “[e]thnic entrepreneurs follow each
other into an economic enclave in entrepreneurial chains”56 and because
“the enterprise of one creates a foothold for the other, [so] that ladders are
constructed which enable small enterprises to climb and grow,” 57 the
network effect among manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers is high as
profits stay in the enclave economy rather than outside it.
The enclave economy58 can be both economically efficient and

49. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, at 12-13.
50. Xi & Geogh, supra note 45, at 1293. Note that the term “enclave” does not necessarily require
physical proximity. Some scholars such as Roger Waldinger recognizes that agglomeration may provide
an extra boost for ethnic businesses but also stresses that ethnic networks provide a similar advantage as
ethnic enclaves even without proximity. Korean networks, for example, provide coethnic advantages even
when they sell to non-Korean customers in non-Korean neighborhoods. See generally Waldinger, supra
note 46 (1993).
51. Xi & Geogh, supra note 45, at 1293.
52. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, at 13.
53. Webner, supra note 46, at 676.
54. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, at 13.
55. See generally Robert M. Jiobu, Ethnic Hegemony and the Japanese of California, 53 AM. REV.
353 (1988); see also Webner, supra note 46, at 676 n.12. A similar level of integration is found in the
New York apparel industry where Italian and Jewish contractors and manufacturers are interconnected in
ancillary industries. Webner, supra note 46.
56. Webner, supra note 46, at 675.
57. Id.
58. Once again, as mentioned supra note 22, there is some dispute among scholars about whether
the enclave economy requires locational clustering or spatial proximity. Some insist that there is a
difference between the general ethnic economy and the more particular subcategory of ethnic enclave,
which does assume additional advantages due to locational clustering. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, at 15.
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psychologically protective for several reasons.59 First, it does not require
knowledge of English, only knowledge of the native language. Second,
the ethnic boundary protects against discrimination and hostility on the
outside and is simultaneously a space of co-ethnic solidarity and trust.
Third, cultural differences that could be an impediment to mainstream
jobs are not an issue in the enclave. Fourth, because the enclave may tend
to trade in ethnic goods, goods that are likely imported from the
homeland, co-ethnics are best positioned to have knowledge in such
goods and thus their goods would be in high demand.
This separateness of the ethnic boundary from the main economy does
not result in detriment but in advantages, precisely because of ethnic
linkages – among employers and employees and co-ethnics creating a
multiplier effect along the different rungs and ladders of the ethnic
economy – that are themselves oiled by a common reservoir of social
capital, social network, and trust. If one focuses on the core issue, the
boundary between ethnics and co-ethnics on the one hand and non-ethnics
on the other, then it is clear that this boundary is a common thread running
through the different variants of the ethnic economy. For example, this
article has discussed the ethnic ownership economy, consisting of
business owners and their co-ethnic helpers and employees. Variations
include the enclave economy which some scholars believe is an ethnic
economy that is also territorially clustered, and what some have called the
ethnic-controlled economy which constitutes “industries, occupations,
and organizations of the general labor market in which co-ethnic
employees exert appreciable and persistent economic power. This power
usually results from their numerical clustering, their numerical
preponderance, their organization, government mandates, or all four.”60

This difference is not important for the purposes of this Article. The literature also recognizes what is
called the ethnic niche, which does not require the existence of ethnic employers hiring co-ethnics. For
example, where government employees have controlled hiring in government jobs and have favored coethnics, an ethnic niche can be formed. Italian, Irish, and Jewish immigrants in the United States
dominated municipal employment through such networks. Id. at 21.
59. Benefits of an ethnic enclave can include a “sense of safe haven for culture, language, religion,
and community.” Caitlin Ziegert McCombs, The Role of Ethnic Enclaves on the Integration Process of
Modern Immigrants: Case Studies in Columbus, Ohio and France 2 (2017), Senior Independent Theses.
https://openworks.wooster.edu/independentstudy/7680. Ethnic enclaves can also be ““[s]paces for shared
cultural practices and celebrations.” Bethany Li, “We Are Already Back”: The Post-Katrina Struggle for
Survival and Community Control in New Orleans East's Vietnamese Community of Versailles, 18 ASIAN
AM. L.J. 25, 47 (2011). Those studying the benefits of the enclave have also noted that it can “provide a
“warm embrace,” especially for newly arrived immigrants, with the ethnic network” and function as a
“‘buffer’ which reduces the cost of cultural or language assimilation . . . .” Simone Schuller and Tanika
Chakraborty, Ethnic Enclave and Immigrant Economic Integration, IZA WORLD OF LABOR 2 (March
2022), at https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/601/pdfs/ethnic-enclaves-and-immigrant-economic-integrat
ion.pdf?v=1.
60. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, at 25.
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As noted,61 the ethnic controlled economy is undergirded by de facto
control, instead of ownership control, and has itself produced ethnic
niches such as those in municipal employment. Any group’s ethnic
ownership economy and ethnic controlled economy constitute the share
of its labor force that exists outside the general labor force.
A.

Culture and Social Capital

In addition to middleman theory and ethnic enclave theory, there is
another body of scholarship that studies the relationship between
collectivism, immigrant cultural attributes, and immigrant business. This
collectivist approach differs from the more individualist stance endemic
in Weber’s theory and opens the door to an examination of collectivist
self-help measures. 62 Small businesses rely on savings rather than bank
loans for financing, 63 as “bankers have historically ignored the capital
needs of small business owners of every ethnoracial background.” 64
Different cultural groups, such as the Chinese and the Amish have norms
that encourage lending among family members, more than the general
population.65 In addition, rotating credit associations as well as various
ethnic self-help institutions such as the Hebrew Free Loan Associations,
are also used by some groups to finance their businesses.66 Inability to get
loans from the formal banking sector has resulted in many ethnic groups
having no choice but to rely on something else, social capital. For
example, immigrant and ethnic groups that have been excluded from the
credit market have turned inward to create alternative mechanisms for
accessing capital. Thus, rotating credit associations are not just economic
institutions but rather, for law and development scholars, are emblematic
and part of a broader framework of informal arrangements that reflect
norms and practices, such as trust and ethnic solidarity that lower
transaction costs and facilitate personalistic economic exchanges and
ethnic economies.
Immigrant groups have also resorted to other kinds of collectivist
measures to raise capital. For example, the Pakistanis have developed
what is referred to as the incubator approach. 67 For example, it is not
uncommon for a Pakistani immigrant community to rely on an appointed
coordinator who matches the new immigrant with someone already

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See supra note 30.
BUTLER, supra note 30, at 23-24.
LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, at 85.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 86-87.
Id. at 87.
This paragraph is drawn from BUTLER, supra note 30, at 27-28.
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anchored within the community. The anchor connects the newcomer with
various employment possibilities, usually in an area the Pakistanis already
have a foothold in, for example, convenience stores. The community
expects the new person to work and save for two years and learn the
business. At the end of the apprenticeship, the community helps the
immigrant with business opportunities, including scouting for locations
where opportunities may exist. Individual savings, along with capital
from the community capital investment fund provided by the Pakistani
community, help the new immigrant take on the new business.
There are different areas of scholarship that have examined how social
capital is leveraged for the purpose of economic development. Ethnicity,
market, and culture have been studied as factors explaining how certain
ethnic groups have been able to produce or make use of ethnic resources
to better themselves economically. Thomas Sowell is a proponent of the
cultural question, that is, the idea that a certain bundle of cultural traits
facilitates entrepreneurship in certain trading-inclined ethnic groups.68
Amy Chua has similarly written about the cultural predispositions that
facilitated the market dominance of “market-dominant ethnic
minorities.”69 Barak Richman has studied how Jewish diamond
merchants in New York rely on private, community, intra-ethnic
institutions, and law to ensure that agreements are enforced. 70 It is
important to note that although law and development scholars have
traditionally used the word “institutions” to mean the formal legal system
encompassing laws, legal rules, courts, and judges,71 the term is now
understood, especially in the new institutional economics literature, to
include formal as well as informal arrangements, such as norms and
beliefs.72 This scholarship with its emphasis on social and cultural capital
and ethnic cohesion supplements and even challenges the standard law
and development menu with its emphasis on formal laws and formal rules.
But institutional economics has added a different dimension to the
conventional rule of law template. As Douglass North explains,
institutions “consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos,

68. See generally THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE: A WORLD VIEW (1994).
69. See generally Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm
for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1 (1998).
70. See generally Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage:
Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 383 (2006).
71. Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia, 34 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 829, 832−34 (2000) (book review).
72. See Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley, The Contribution of Douglass North to New
Institutional Economics, in INSTITUTIONS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGACY
OF DOUGLASS NORTH 11, 27-28 (Sebastian Galiani & Itai Sened eds., 2014). Avner Greif has similarly
studied informal systems of enforcement. See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE
MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 12-13 (2006).
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customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules
(constitutions, laws, property rights).”73 These informal norms which
provide “order without law”74 are a crucial form of resources relied upon
by ethnic groups that are excluded from the mainstream and/or not able
to count on formal institutions and formal laws. Noncompliance with
informal, community norms subjects norm breakers to ostracism, a severe
penalty if in-group belonging is crucial for one’s identity and livelihood.75
At the same time, emphasis on informal norms and institutions does
not necessarily entail rejection of the need 76for formal institutions. This
is not an either/or proposition. Both formal and informal institutions can
facilitate exchanges and constrain bad behaviors. But at some point, as
societies evolve beyond the small, clan-based, or ethnic-based group, they
“need effective, impersonal contract enforcement, because personal ties,
voluntaristic constraints, and ostracism are no longer effective as more
complex and impersonal forms of exchange emerge. It is not that these
personal and social alternatives are unimportant; they are still significant
even in today's interdependent world.”77 Scholars have shown that
countries that have legal systems that enforce contract and property rights
are, predictably and unsurprisingly, better equipped to maximize
economic performance. 78 The role of legal institutions in the economic
sphere is, as stated by Max Weber, of primary importance: “[M]odern
rational capitalism has need, not only of the technical means of
production, but of a calculable legal system and of administration in terms
of formal rules.”79 Douglass North states that “impersonal exchange with
third-party enforcement . . . [through an impartial judiciary] has been the
crucial underpinning of successful modern economies involved in the
complex contracting necessary for modern economic growth” 80 and that
“the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of
contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and

73. Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 97, 97 (1991).
74. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 284
(1991).
75. Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Market, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 864-74 (1999).
See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi
Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 527-31 (1993); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in
Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857, 860-82 (1989).
76. LAN CAO, CULTURE IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: NURTURING POSITIVE CHANGE 69-70
(2016).
77. North, supra note 73, at 100.
78. See generally MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed., 1954);
David M. Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISC. L. REV. 720 (1972).
79. WEBER, supra note 21, at 25.
80. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 35 (1990).
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contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.”81 It is virtually
uncontested among scholars that a formal legal system of secure property
and contract rights constitute a necessary foundation for market
development.82 Law and development scholars and practitioners have
been busy studying and implementing rule of law projects that have been
widely accepted as facilitating the establishment of laws and institutions
necessary to support a functional market economy.
Therefore, there are two primary schools of thought on the question of
what drives economic development – culture on the one hand and law on
the other hand, and both schools are in an ideological power struggle
regarding the ultimate cause of underdevelopment of various countries.83
It is understandable that ethnic economies would trigger, whether
explicitly or implicitly, the same ongoing tug of war surrounding the
debate on economic development. While the law versus culture debate
has been taking place in law and development circles concerning which
laws and which cultural package best catalyze and sustain development
for developing countries,84 the same debate exists with respect to cultural
or ethnic groups within countries.
So, the question that persists in standard law and development queries
– why are some countries so poor85 – can also operate as a subtext in the
scholarship on ethnic economies. Why are some out, excluded groups
able to engage in self-help via ethnic economies and not others? Not
everyone avoids or evades the issue, as some scholars have teased the
subtext out of text, observing that while it is one thing to ask why some
countries are poor, it is another to ask “about a culture of wealth
acquisition compared between different ethnic and racial groups,”86
which uncomfortably suggests in effect that some cultures can create
wealth and others cannot.
81. Id. at 54.
82. “Thriving markets require not only the appropriate property rights system, an unfettered price
mechanism, and a law of contracts . . . .” Barry R. Weingast, Constitution As Governance Structures: The
Political Foundations of Secure Markets, 149 J. INST’L & THEORETICAL ECON. 286, 287 (1993).
83. Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, An Alternative View of Immigrant Exceptionalism,
Particularly As It Relates to Blacks: A Response to Chua and Rubenfeld, 103 CAL. L. REV. 989, 994
(2015) (describing the “long-running skirmish between the ‘culture’ and ‘law and institutions’ schools”).
84. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 3435 (1995); Lawrence E. Harrison, Introduction: Why Culture Matters, in CULTURE MATTERS: HOW
VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS xvii, xxx (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000).
85. See generally DAVID LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS: WHY SOME ARE SO
RICH AND SOME SO POOR (1995); Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Political Losers as a Barrier
to Economic Development, 90 AM. ECON. REV 126 (2000); Daron Acermoglu, Simon Johnson & James
A. Robinson, Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income
Distribution, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1241 (2002); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth:
Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUDS. 503 (2001); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF
CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).
86. Brown, supra note 83, at 995-96.
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While Amy Chua has explored this issue head-on, her inquiries are
situated in the context of Third World, developing countries. 87 First, Chua
noted that there are ethnic minorities who, despite minority status, have
managed to become economically dominant and second, that they have
also utilized ethnically based resources to create wealth. 88 For example,
she observed that “[t]hrough a robust nationwide network of interestbearing tontines, or local lending associations, the Bamiléké operate an
informal capital market so efficient it constantly threatens to put
government-owned banks out of business.”89 Thus, the question of why
the ethnic Chinese minority has managed to become so market-dominant
in Southeast Asia; or why Indians and the Kikuyu tribe have been so
successful in Kenya and other parts of East Africa; or the Tutsis in
Rwanda; or the Ibos and Bamiléké in Nigeria and Cameroon 90 may raise
questions about how ethnic minorities are able to convert cultural
resources into economic ones. At the same time, because this cultural
landscape is embedded in “dysfunctional,” relatively “backward,” nonWestern countries where collusion, cronyism, corruption and
dysfunctional or predatory capitalism are prevalent, the cultural question
is blurred. In that context, the implication may be that ethnic minorities
are market-dominant not necessarily because of superior culture but
because of favoritism from corrupt rulers or as in the case of post-Soviet
Russia, leveraged alliances with elites to plunder wealth from state-owned
enterprises as they underwent massive fire sales through so-called
privatization.91 The right set of legal institutions – commercial laws,
property, contracts, anti-bribery, antitrust – could alleviate the problem
by correcting or minimizing market dysfunction and market distortion. 92
Chua and other scholars recognize that if a group got rich through
predatory practices and cronyism, for example, being given illicit
preferences for the purchase of state-owned shares, then one possible

87. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC
HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 111 (Anchor Books 2004).
88. Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and
Development, 108 Yale L. J. 1, 21-22 (1998); CHUA, supra note 87.
89. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC
HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 111 (Anchor Books 2004).
90. Id. at 18, 35-36, 105-07, 111. The Ibos are even referred to as the “Jews of Nigeria” and the
Bamiléké as the “Ibo of Cameroon.” Id.
91. Id. at 77-79, 105, 157-58.
92. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the “Rule of Law,” 101
MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2284-85 (2003) (quoting the “Rule-of-Law Assistance Standard Menu” in at
THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 168 (1999).
Lan Cao, The Ethnic Question in Law and Development (Book Review), 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1044, 10861100 (2004); LAN CAO, CULTURE IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: NURTURING POSITIVE CHANGE 70-85
(2016). For a discussion of the failures of law and development, see LAN CAO, CULTURE IN LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT: NURTURING POSITIVE CHANGE 80-103 (2016)
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response is a better set of laws that would monitor and constrain or correct
such practices.93 In other words, there is a confluence of remedies that
combine or include law and cultural resources. If a minority ethnic group
can become economically dominant through illicit predatory transactions
with state elites, institutions and laws “can act as constraints on bad
behavior (a classic instance of law).”94 Again, these recommendations are
within the standard law and development prescriptions. 95
The other question that is not fully explored is the cultural question,
although Chua alludes to it throughout her book. In other words, when the
inquiry into whether the culture question is a factor in economic
development is confined to developing countries, the issue can be left in
a gray zone of ambiguity. Indeed, perhaps to avoid having to attribute the
ethnic resources as a factor in the market-dominant minority groups’
success, Chua makes no attempt to identify the causes underlying a
minority group's market dominance. 96 To the contrary, she disclaimed any
such effort, stating that “[e]xplaining the market dominance of various
ethnic groups is not the focus of this book.”97 The willingness to observe
market dominance and its effect but the unwillingness to theorize about
its cause reflects perhaps her own reluctance to wade into the thorny
cultural causation question and her own conflicted sense about the extent
to which collusion is a significant factor in market dominance.
While Chua provided many examples of corrupt alliances between
market-dominant minorities,98 she also cast doubt on whether market
dominance was achieved via such alliances. For example, she cautioned,
“[T]he suggestion that political cronyism is the sole or even principal
explanation of Indian economic dominance in Kenya overstates the
case.”99 Chua further noted,

93. Brown, supra note 83, at 995-998; see also Chua, supra note 88, at 103-105 (acknowledging
the benefits for South and Vietnam of market reforms but touting the need to disperse such benefits beyond
the market dominant ethnic minorities like white South Africans in South Africa and Chinese ethnic
minorities in Vietnam); Tom Ginsburg, Democracy, Markets and Doomsaying: Is Ethnic Conflict
Inevitable, 22 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 310, 318-319 (2004) (Book review) (arguing that more market
liberalization and allowing more market actors, including foreign investors, is needed to forestall cronyism
or klepto privatization).
94. Brown, supra note 83, at 998. As Eleanor Brown observed, such “narrative of wealth
acquisition is largely about law.” Id.
95. CAO, supra note 92, at 98-103.
96. CHUA, supra note 88, at 42.
97. CHUA, supra note 88, at 42.
98. See, e.g., id. at 28, 30 (discussing the wealth of the Sino-Burmese and the handsome payoffs
made to Burma's ruling political elite); id. at 43-44, 151-52 (discussing Chinese alliances with the Suharto
regime in Indonesia); id. at 153-57 (discussing Chinese alliances with the Marcos regime in the
Philippines); id. at 148-51 (discussing Lebanese alliances with the government officials of Sierra Leone);
id. at 113-15, 157-58 (discussing Asian Indians’ alliances with the Moi regime in Kenya).
99. Id. at 113.
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While political favoritism is a frequent, exacerbating problem in societies
with a market-dominant minority, such favoritism tends to be more the
consequence than the cause of market dominance. Most market-dominant
minorities, whether the Bamiléké in Cameroon or Indians in Fiji, are
disproportionately economically successful at every level of society,
including small traders, retailers, and shopkeepers with no political
connections whatsoever.100

It is quite conceivable, in fact, that members of a minority ethnic group
could, by skill and hard work or even clever scheming, become wealthy
and then, to cope with majority resentment and hatred, turn to corrupt
alliances with government officials for political cover. Collusion could be
an effect, not a cause, of wealth. For example, the fact that, according to
Chua, elites in Russia are primarily Jewish and those in Burma are
overwhelmingly Chinese – both groups historically resented in their
respective regions – it would not be surprising that both would turn to the
state for protection by whatever means. Given widespread resentment
against them from the outside world, it would not be surprising either that
they would turn further inward, doing business within, relying on internal
resources and networks.101
The next Section of this article looks at two glaring omissions in the
culture and market debate which result from a continuing unwillingness
to bring to the forefront the subtext about cultural resources in the United
States and whether African Americans, and not just ethnic immigrants,
can access them. As previously noted, studies of ethnic economies in the
United States have looked at those established by immigrants and in
recent years, African American immigrants. 102 More on point to this
article is the subtext identified in the introduction, which is the looming
question about African Americans and wealth-creation.103 Sometimes the
question is not a subtext but asked outright. As Eleanor Brown asked,
given the emphasis on “Nigerian economic success, a comparison to
African American economic success (or lack thereof) is foreseeable.” 104
Bonacich wondered: “How can we explain the closing of ranks reaction
of these particular groups, and their peculiar ability to create success out
of hatred? (Or to cite cases, why have Japanese Americans been able to
overcome racism, while [B]lacks have not?)”105 Ivan Light asked, “[W]hy
should the foreign-born in general have much higher rates of business
100. Id. at 265.
101. Brown, supra note 83, at 998, 1001.
102. See, e.g., Monte Williams, Hair Stylists From Africa Arrive, Driving Down Prices, N.Y. TIMES
(May 19, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/19/nyregion/bargain-braiders-battle-for-heads-hairstylists-africa-arrive-driving-down.html.
103. Id.
104. Brown, supra note 83, at 990.
105. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 42; Bonacich, supra note 23, at 583-94.
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proprietorship than Mexicans and especially [B]lacks, the more
disadvantaged of all?”106
Wealth creation or acquisition has been different among countries but
also among ethnic groups. Translated back into the context of this article,
how have some groups done it via the creation of ethnic economies and
not others? Is the explanation based on law or on culture?
II. LAW, CULTURE, AND ETHNIC ECONOMIES: AFRICAN AMERICANS

In examining the path immigrants, particular Black immigrants
either from the West Indies or from Africa, have forged upon arrival
in the United States, some commentators and scholars have objected
to the way scholarship on this subject have omitted crucial elements
endemic to the ethnic economies of those immigrants. 107 Such
omission, it has been said, ignored the role law and institutions have
played in the establishment of ethnic economies by such groups, in
essence creating the impression that it is “superior culture” that
accounts for such African immigrant market activities.108 The point of
such critique is to call into question the notion that culture accounts for
economic success and to argue instead for an institutional or legal
inquiry, one that recognizes that, at least in some instances, immigrant
groups succeed in business because they bring with them “communal
rules . . . [that] replicate historical market practices that began outside
the United States and across borders.” 109 Eleanor Brown, for example,
is concerned that by ignoring institutional advantages that voluntary
Black migrants bring with them, such scholars too quickly turn to
cultural explanations, which then leads us back to the subtext: “What
is wrong with African Americans?”110 Brown is correct that there is in
fact a lurking subtext, regardless of the intention of scholars, whereby
implicit comparisons are made between, for example, Nigerian
migrants and African Americans. 111
Brown’s critique centers on what is omitted from the story – the legal
and institutional advantages that Black immigrants, like those from
106. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 42; Ivan Light, Asian Enterprise in America, in SELF-HELP IN
URBAN AMERICA 33 (Scott Cummings ed., 1980).
107. Ta-Nehisi Coates, Why Do Black Immigrants Do Better Than Native Blacks, THE ATLANTIC,
March 23, 2009, https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2009/03/why-do-black-immigrantsdo-better-than-native-blacks/6891/; SUZANNE MODEL, WEST INDIAN IMMIGRANTS: A BLACK SUCCESS
STORY 49-70 (2008).
108. Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, On Black South Africans, Black Americans, and Black West
Indians” Some Thoughts On We Want What’s Ours, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1037, 1040, 1053-1059 (2016)
109. Brown, supra note 83, at 1003.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1004.
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Nigeria and the West Indies, bring to the United States when they arrive.
If there is any comparison to be made with African Americans, the
comparison should be not on cultural differences but on the different
institutional environment faced by immigrants, even Black immigrants,
versus African Americans.112 Instead of pointing to cultural differences to
explain the different economic conditions of Black West Indies
immigrants versus African Americans, Brown attributes this difference to
the latter’s early exposure to property and contract rights as landholders
in the Caribbean.113 Market advantages accrued to Black slaves, due to
the various arrangements of slave holdings in the West Indies made it
possible for Black slaves to own property and enter into contracts, even
as slaves. Thereafter, land sales and other commercial activities provided
the financing of emigration to the United States, whereupon West Indians
were able to engage in wealth acquisition and market domination via
ethnic economies at a greater proportion than African American
descendants of slaves.114 Institutional conditions in the home country
affect how such immigrants parlay opportunities created here to become
or be dubbed “model minorities.” Indeed, Brown emphasized a very
important point and that calls into question the assumption that “the very
same institutional environment within a single country”115 would dictate
the same outcome. Institutional framework pre-arrival and post-arrival
will affect the economic trajectory of the new group.
Although the subtext in the scholarship on ethnic economies is
concerning, this Section of the article takes a different approach. While
Brown urges a focus on institutions and laws,116 including preexisting
ethnic resources that many ethnic, including Black, immigrants bring with
them, this article focuses on the cultural aspects of ethnic economies, but
this time, not those established by immigrants, but by African Americans.
The objective is to correct the historical misperception that African
Americans went from “slavery to freedom to the ghettos of American
cities”117 and to highlight the tremendous African American culture of
self-help and solidarity that has not received sufficient attention in legal
scholarship. This Section looks at African American ethnic economies
and the cultural resources marshalled to construct them. It illustrates that
African Americans, like other ethnic and/or immigrant groups, have used
many strategies to address their economic and political plight. One of the
112. Id.
113. Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, The Blacks Who “Got Their Forty Acres”: A Theory of Black
West Indian Migrant Asset Acquisition, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 27, 41-42 (2014).
114. See generally Brown, supra note 102.
115. Brown, supra note 83, at 1004.
116. Felix Chang refers to this approach as one that emphasized “structural explanations.” Felix B.
Chang, Ethnically Segmented Markets: Korean-Owned Black Hair Stores, 97 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (2022).
117. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 85.
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strategies has been what Booker T. Washington himself advocated,
separate economies and self-help.118 That this strategy has not been
continued on a large scale is a result of factors beyond the scope of this
article, for example, of white destruction of African American
economies119 and the subsequent pursuit by African Americans of
political integration and civil rights.120
A. African American Ethnic Economies
In a landmark book An American Dilemma published in 1944, Gunnar
Myrdal described the American dilemma as a moral dilemma, grounded
in the antithesis between the professed values of America versus the
reality of how those values were not extended to African Americans. 121
Myrdal also introduced his principle of cumulative causation,122 whereby
“[w]hite prejudice and discrimination keep the Negro low in standards of
living, health, education, manners, and morals. This, in turn, gives support
to white prejudice.”123 Thus, as commentators have noted, “when a
number of different debilitating factors, such as discrimination, poor
housing, poor health care, and poor schooling affect one another, an
equilibrium of sorts can develop that either locks those most severely
affected into their predicament or shifts into a downward spiral, a ‘vicious
circle.’”124 The dynamic Myrdal observed is one of “action and

118. Booker T. Washington, The Awakening of the Negro, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 1896, at
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1896/09/the-awakening-of-the-negro/305449/. See also
infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
119. The ethnic enclave Hayti in Durham, North Carolina was founded after the Civil War as an
independent Black community by freed slaves who came to work at tobacco warehouses and ended up
owning more than 200 businesses. Hayti was a self-sufficient enclave with a library, hotel, theater, hospital
and other businesses and declined when a freeway project razed down houses and businesses and split the
community in two. See generally Booker T. Washington, Durham, North Carolina, A City of Negro
Enterprises, in THE BOOKER T. WASHINGTON PAPERS VOL. 11, 1911-1912 at 56-64 (Louis R. Harlan and
Raymond W. Smock eds. 1981). Tulsa, Oklahoma, like Durham, North Carolina, also had a black ethnic
enclave called Greenwood, which was destroyed by whites in 1921. The neighborhood constituted one of
the most prosperous for African Africans and was also referred to as Black Wall Street. During the course
of white attacks, 10,000 Black people were injured and 35 square blocks destroyed. Those who were killed
were buried in mass graves and many survivors were put into internment camps. See Amna Nawaz, How
A Racist White Mob Ruined Black Wall Street 100 Years Ago, PBS NEWS HOUR (May 31, 2021),.
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-a-racist-white-mob-ruined-black-wall-street-100-years-ago.
120. For a continuing debate on assimilation versus cultural pluralism among African Americans,
see Alphonso Pinkney, The Assimilation of Afro-Americans, 1 BLACK SCHOLAR 36 (1969).
121. See generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1962).
122. Id. at 75. Myrdal viewed this principle as “a main theoretical tool in studying social change.”
Id.
123. Id. Myrdal viewed this principle as “a main theoretical tool in studying social change.” Id.
124. Sissela Bok, Foreword, in AN AMERICAN DILEMMA REVISITED xvii (Obie Clayton, Jr. ed.,
1996).
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interaction”125 whereby a positive change in one factor – a decrease in
white prejudice, for example – would lead to a virtuous change in other
indicators of discrimination and conversely, a positive change in African
American standards of living or health, or education, etc. would yield a
similarly responsive change in white prejudice. Consequently, as
commentators have noted, “[i]mprovement in any one variable should
lead to gains in other areas as well. But where to start?”126
It is not surprising that Myrdal would have recommended a multipronged approach to improving the condition of African Americans,
proposing that institutional problems could be remedied by institutional
solutions. His recommendations included turning to churches, schools,
trade unions, and government organizations to ensure African American
voting and civil rights which can play key roles in improving the
conditions of African Americans and catalyzing the beginning of the
virtual cycle.127 Despite the fact that many of Myrdal’s proposed policies,
even when implemented, did not yield the desired result,128 the book
“stands today as a baseline for the analysis of race relations in
America.”129 In many ways, Myrdal’s cumulative causation principle
required a multi-pronged approach. And throughout the years, African
Americans have indeed pursued multiple solutions to the multiple
problems they faced – economic separateness because of segregation and
political inclusion/assimilation through desegregation or integration. One
approach is the establishment of their own separate ethnic economies,
which is discussed below.
Myrdal’s observation about African Americans’ exclusion from the
white economy is, in many essential ways, similar to that faced by
immigrants who, because of exclusion, turn to their own ethnic
economies:
The exclusion from the larger white economy means a severe restriction of
the opportunities for Negroes to reach an upper- or middle-class status. It
represents one of the main social mechanisms by which the Negro upperand middle-classes are kept small. . . . The latter have to work in the white
economy which does not want Negroes in such positions.130

As commentators have noted, Myrdal’s data supported his observation,
that “Blacks were numerous among professional workers because of the
segregated Southern school system and the segregated churches; teachers
125.
126.
(1994).
127.
128.
129.
130.

MYRDAL, supra note 121, at 76.
Steven Pressman, An American Dilemma: Fifty Years Later, 28 J. ECON. ISSUES 577, 579
Id. at 579-80.
Id.
John Sibley Butler, Myrdal Revisited: The Negro in Business, 124 DAEDALUS 199, 199 (1995).
Id. at 200 (quoting MYRDAL, supra note 121, at 304 (Harper & Brothers 1944)).
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and ministers accounted for about two-thirds of all [B]lack professional
workers.”131
A strategy of leveraging separateness of course is the typical
middleman minority strategy as further developed in the sociology of
entrepreneurship. It is a strategy of self-help and solidarity that African
Americans have pursued, similar to that of other ethnic immigrant
minorities, although the sociology literature on the subject has essentially
neglected this tradition of entrepreneurship and group self-help of African
Americans which began in the 1700s and continued even through
slavery.132 During the pre-Civil War period, and as early as the 1700s,
free Blacks made a living as independent shop keepers, tailors, owners of
restaurants, even of brick factories, and engineering companies, in many
cities throughout the Union, such as New York City, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, and Cincinnati.133 During the Colonial period, it is estimated
that there were about 60,000 free African Americans 134 in a wide variety
of different businesses, such as merchandising, real estate, manufacturing,
construction, and transportation.135 The development of enterprises by
free Blacks in the North was especially impressive in Cincinnati.
Although 48%of Blacks in the city were slaves in 1835, by 1840, free
Blacks had an impressive combined holding valued at $19,000 in personal
and $209,000 in real property, which by 1852, had increased to more than
$500,000.136
Philadelphia was a thriving community of economic enterprises, large
and small, that were owned by African Americans. This is not surprising
because Pennsylvania’s legislature was the first to emancipate slaves in
1780, with free slaves making a living for themselves in fifty-seven
different trades, ranging from bakers and blacksmiths to caulkers and
cabinetmakers.137 Several prominent businesspeople came from
Philadelphia, such as James Forten, who owned a sail making business
that employed many Blacks as well as whites,138 along with other notable
Black business owners such as Moses Beach and Robert Mogle.139

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 202.
BUTLER, supra note 30, at 83.
Butler, supra note 129, at 202.
BUTLER, supra note 30, at 43; ROBERT H. KINZER & EDWARD SAGARIN, THE NEGRO IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 27 (1950).
135. See generally Juliet E. K. Walker, Racism, Slavery, and Free Enterprise: Black
Entrepreneurship in the United States Before the Civil War, 60 BUS. HIST. REV . 333 (1986).
136. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 49; see also ABRAM H. HARRIS, THE NEGRO AS CAPITALIST 6-7
(1936).
137. HENRY M. MINTON, M.D., EARLY HISTORY OF NEGROES IN BUSINESS IN PHILADELPHIA 8-10
(1913).
138. Walker, supra note 135, at 352; BUTLER, supra note 30, at 46.
139. BUTLER, supra note 30 at 46-47.
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Following in the middleman minority trajectory, free Blacks in
Philadelphia had a concentrated presence in the service sector.
In personal service enterprises the free Negroes had practically no
competition . . . . And the fact that white persons tended to avoid enterprises
of this character because of their servile status gave free Negroes an
advantage in this sphere. Hence, personal service occupations were open
freely to [B]lack enterprisers and constituted a source of considerable
income. Their success in these lines has been looked upon as a shrewd
capitalization of social proscription.140

The historical record also shows, unsurprisingly, that Blacks faced
barriers borrowing money from banks 141 and turned to self-help and
community solidarity for mutual assistance, like immigrants. Blacks in
Philadelphia formed mutual aid societies that took in, through capital
contribution, funds for mutual improvement and assistance in formation
of new businesses. 142 In addition, there was also a money lending business
for Blacks without access to credit in both the North and the South, a
parallel that could be found in immigrant efforts to engage in the
extension of credit among co-ethnics.143 In New Orleans, for example, in
the 1840s, “there were eight free Negro brokers who speculated in cotton
futures and, at times, performed many of the services of the commercial
bank.”144
In Southern cities, free Blacks were able to create what sociologists
now call ethnic niches, as they had almost monopolistic advantages in
certain areas, such as catering.145 For women who went North as part of
the Great Migration146 and faced a rise in hostility against Blacks in the
North, due to the increase in Black population, many had to turn inward
to establish ethnic niches.147 As segregation and discrimination against
Blacks in the North increased, Black merchants who had had white
clientele found themselves increasingly isolated and “restricted to a
racially segregated consumer market.”148 At the same time, it became
140. HARRIS, supra note 136, at 9-10.
141. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 47.
142. HARRIS, supra note 136, at 20-21.
143. Basu & Werbner, supra note 4, at 240.
144. HARRIS, supra note 136, at 21-22.
145. Butler, supra note 129, at 205.
146. Before the Great Migration, race relations in the North were mild due to the small number of
African Americans who were thus allowed to market their goods and services to whites. Robert L. Boyd,
The Great Migration to the North and the Rise of Ethnic Niches for African American Women in Beauty
Culture and Hairdressing, 1910-1920, 29 SOCIO. FOCUS 33, 34 (1996).
147. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of ethnic niches. Boyd, supra
note 146, at 34 (relying on ethnic niche and ethnic enclave economy scholarship to demonstrate that “both
ethnicity and gender formed the basis of this occupational niche for African American women in the urban
North during the Great Migration”).
148. Boyd, supra note 146, at 36.
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obvious to both white and Black merchants that the influx of several
hundred thousand people would result in an increase in Black purchasing
power, that is, a “Negro market” in a relatively concentrated geographic
community.149 In Chicago, for example, the number of Black-owned
businesses rose almost 240%, not in retailing or wholesaling but rather in
the provision of intimate, personal services, such as hairdressing and
funeral undertaking, for Blacks because whites either did not know how
to do Black hair or, in the latter case, refused to take care of Black
bodies.150
Thus in hairdressing and other beauty industries, African American
hair stylists had inside knowledge that whites lacked, creating a
segregated, protected ethnic niche that was also relatively easy to enter,
especially because African Americans had established beauty schools to
train beauticians. 151 “The tightening of the color line during this time
relegated many African Americans to the secondary labor market, and the
segregation of occupations by gender further restricted many African
American to the lowest-status jobs of this segment of the work force.” 152
Thus, the hairdressing niche remained an especially significant niche for
African American women even during World War I when African
American men had access to industrial jobs that opened up for them due
to labor shortages.153 In addition, this niche spurred other crosspollination businesses for African Americans, leading to the
establishment of small-scale production of cosmetic products in the early
twentieth century such as “High Brown Face Powder” by the Overton
Hygienic Company providing employment to more than thirty people
serving the cosmetic needs of African Americans. 154
“An ethnic niche in an entrepreneurial occupation (that is, an
occupation that lends itself to self-employment) can be a foundation for

149. Id. at 36-37.
150. Id. at 37. A Black man sued a white-owned funeral home in Louisiana in 1971 when it refused
to hold a wake for his mother on its premises. A federal court granted summary judgment in a class action
suit which alleged that mortuaries in the area refused “to handle black bodies.”
https://www.splcenter.org/seeking-justice/case-docket/wilbert-oliver-et-al-vs-escude-funeral-homes-incet-al.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 40.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 41-42. The company was founded by Anthony Overton who also used proceeds from his
Black beauty business to establish the Victory Life Insurance Company and the Douglass National Bank.
Id. Madame C. J. Walker developed a popular hair relaxer and later founded a cosmetic company for
African Americans, becoming the first woman self-made millionaire in the United States. However, note
that this “these niches were based upon an impecunious clientele that was r esidentiar y and
socially segr egated from the larger society. The cash-flow generated by this ghettoized clientele was
simply insufficient to support a sizable number of successful African American entrepreneurs.” Id.
at 43.
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an ethnic enclave economy for a particular ethnic minority group.”155 As
mentioned, ethnic niches can arise as a response to prejudicial exclusion
and hostility from the mainstream society as well as a leveraging of ethnic
resources and skills that are unique to the ethnic group, in which case
merchants from the group benefit from a protected market not available
to non-ethnic merchants. An example of an ethnic niche formed in
response to hostility and exclusion is that of undertaking, resulting from
the refusal of white undertakers to touch Black corpses. 156 Conversely,
there are also instances in which ethnicity can be equated with market
power whereby ethnic sellers of certain ethnic products, such as kosher
pickles or wonton soup, derive a market advantage from common ethnic
identity.157
Waldinger and Aldrich, however, argued that Blacks were able to
create more economic opportunities for themselves in the South than in
the North and that by mid-nineteenth century, a staggering two thirds of
free slaves were self-employed or owned their own business.158 Although
free Blacks engaged in entrepreneurship, it is important to recognize that
despite their so-called free status, they were under draconian restrictions
by the state, making their success in launching any business at all quite
remarkable. For example, “[b]y 1835 the right of assembly had been taken
away from all free Negroes in the South[.] . . . Benevolent societies and
similar organizations were not allowed to convene. . . . A number of
proscriptions made it especially difficult for free Negroes to make a
living.”159 Blacks who made money found it difficult to invest their
capital, for example, because banks “denied Afro-Americans the
opportunity to become investors.”160 Blacks were also excluded from
participation in the stock market.161
Historians have ample documentation of Black entrepreneurship and
enterprise. 162 In both the North and South, African Americans established
what we would now call ethnic economies and gained the strongest
foothold in areas where whites did not want to operate, in labor-intensive
155. Id. at 34.
156. Id. at 35.
157. Id. at 34.
158. Roger Waldinger & Howard Aldrich, Trends In Ethnic Business in the United States, in
ETHNIC ENTREPRENEURS: IMMIGRANT BUSINESS IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 58 (Roger Waldinger, Howard
Aldrich & Robin Ward eds., 1990).
159. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 45 (quoting Bonacich, supra note 23, at 583-94); KINZER &
SAGARIN, supra note 134, at 32.
160. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 49.
161. Id.
162. See e.g., JULIET E. K. WALKER. FREE FRANK: A BLACK PIONEER ON THE ANTEBELLUM
FRONTIER (1983); GARY B. MILLS, THE FORGOTTEN PEOPLE: CANE RIVER’S CREOLES OF COLOR (1977);
LEONARD P. CURRY, THE FREE BLACK IN URBAN AMERICA, 1880–1850: THE SHADOW OF A DREAM
(1981).
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and service-oriented businesses 163 in which Blacks had more expertise
than whites, such as craftsmanship, where literacy and education were not
a prerequisite and where, especially in the South, there was a general
contempt for certain kinds of laboring.164 Historians observed that
“[b]efore the Civil War, then, expressions of [B]lack entrepreneurs were
shaped by the [B]lack community, both slave and free, for the promotion
of [B]lack economic interests rather than for the profits of slave owners
or white employers.”165
Like other immigrant groups who placed great weight on the education
of their children, Black Americans were able to establish Black schools
as early as the 1800s, prompting W.E.B. Dubois to take note of the “upper
class” Blacks who were presumably descendants of the entrepreneurial
class.166 After the Civil War, Booker T. Washington was a well-known
adherent of the entrepreneurship route, but it’s important to keep in mind
that he was simply advocating an already preexisting entrepreneurship
tradition.167 Due to the high-profile conflict with W.E.B. Dubois,
misperceptions about Washington have continued, causing some to view
him as a “cowardly Uncle Tom, financed and controlled by white money,
leading his people into a new form of slavery.”168 Washington, in fact,
developed a deliberate strategy of Black self-help, using a tradition that
had taken hold since the early days of Black history in America, based on
his understanding “of the importance of business development for
survival, change, resistance, advancement, and, ultimately, real freedom,
empowerment, and equality.”169 In the ethnic economy tradition, his was
a strategy in which African Americans could be “economic producers”
rather than just “consumers.”170 Scholarship that evaluates the historical
contribution of Washington characterizes his work as one that continues
to have great significance and relevance in today’s world:
The new civil rights revolution of today is about economic development.
How is that different from what Booker T. Washington was advocating a

163. JOSEPH A. PIERCE, NEGRO BUSINESS AND BUSINESS EDUCATION 6 (1947).
164. KINZER & SAGARIN, supra note 134, at 35-37.
165. Walker, supra note 135, at 375.
166. Butler, supra note 129, at 205.
167. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 72. “Washington drew ideas from the experiences of Afro-American
businessmen who had already attained a certain degree of success. Stories of successful businesses run by
the free Afro-Americans in both the North and South since the 1700s had been passed down through the
decades.” Id.
168. MICHAEL B. BOSTON, THE BUSINESS STRATEGY OF BOOKER T. WASHINGTON: ITS
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION xi (2010). “To date, volumes of scholarly materials have been
written and published on Washington’s educational philosophy and his supposed accommodationist
leadership strategy, but little has been written about his entrepreneurial ideas and practices.” Id. at xiv.
169. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 70; BOSTON, supra note 168, at xiii.
170. BOSTON, supra note 168, at xii.
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century ago? Whether or not we are where we should be or want to be with
economic development in the [B]lack community, there has always been a
strong emphasis throughout on business and entrepreneurship as well as on
education. These themes started with Booker T. Washington. 171

Similarly, in the ethnic economy tradition whereby ethnic immigrants
tend to remain within their insular communities to avoid mainstream
hostility and forego political activism or even participation, 172
Washington also saw the limit of political participation for Blacks173 and
opted for an economic route instead, stating that any “race that has
anything to contribute to the markets of the world is long in any degree
ostracized. It is important and right that all privileges of law be ours, but
it is vastly more important that we be prepared for the exercise of these
privileges.”174 Although there were Black leaders who chose protest to
achieve civil and political rights, those like Washington who pursued
economics as a different route tend to eschew politics.175
Given the context of the times, the Reconstruction period could be
characterized as a historical nadir for Blacks because it showed that
despite the end of slavery, there was no real hope for Blacks to achieve
equality, even in voting rights where white Southern Democrats, using
violence and other presumably legal means, were vociferous in
preventing Blacks from exercising their political rights. 176 In addition, the
1877 Compromise was itself a severe setback for Black rights. Pursuant
to this informal compromise settling the disputed 1876 Presidential
elections, the Republican Party candidate Rutherford Hayes would be
President in exchange for the promise to remove federal troops from
South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana.177 In another devastating setback,
171. Id. at 143.
172. BONACICH & MODELL, supra note 5, at 16:
[M]iddleman groups are noted for not participating in local politics except as they impinge on the
affairs of their own groups. . . . The core of the community . . . tends to focus its political energies
internally and to deal with the surrounding polity as a corporate entity, its main concern being the
way in which that polity is treating the minority.
Id.
173. BOSTON, supra note 168, at 108.
174. Booker T. Washington, The Atlanta Exposition Address, in JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ISIDORE
STARR, THE NEGRO IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA: A READER ON THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
88 (1967).
175. WILLIAM Z. FOSTER, THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 286-87 (1954); Also
consider:
Many of Washington’s most vehement critics promoted such a strategy and were angered and
frustrated that Washington did not overtly do the same. However, most of these critics lived in
cities or in the North where brutal retaliation for such protesting was not an imminent threat as it
was in the rural South where Washington and most African Americans lived.
BOSTON, supra 168, at 147.
176. BOSTON, supra note 168, at 2.
177. Compromise of 1877, HISTORY (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/us-
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the Supreme Court in 1883 declared the Civil Rights Act of 1875
unconstitutional.178 The Act stated that
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to
the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities,
and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and
other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and
limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race
and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.179

General William Sherman’s 1865 order to set aside, for freed Black
slaves, forty-acre tracts of land between Charleston, South Carolina, and
Jacksonville, Florida, also turned out to be an illusion.
The story behind “40 acres and a slave” was that when General
Sherman asked Garrison Frazier, an African American Baptist minister,
whether Blacks would rather live “scattered among the whites, or in
colonies by yourselves,” Frazier picked the latter. 180 Sherman was
convinced that freed Blacks believed that the way to be free from white
domination was through education and ownership of land, give and take
some additional leftover Army mules.181 As it turned out, President
Andrew Jackson reversed General Sherman’s order, decreeing that the
land would be returned to its former Confederate owners. 182By 1890,
African Americans in the South had lost challenges to Jim Crow laws and
the fight for civil and political rights was at its nadir.183
Given this backdrop of both political and economic “gotchas”
comprising of unfulfilled promises and dashed hopes, combined with a
protracted history of lynching and mob violence, 184 Booker T.
Washington’s response was again quite similar to that of ethnic
immigrants confronted with hostility. Faced with the passage of the
Chinese Exclusion Act, federal, state, municipal and other organizations
imposed unparalleled restrictions on the Chinese in America. They were
not eligible for naturalization, forbidden to marry outside their group,
encountered housing and labor discrimination and licensing laws that kept
presidents/compromise-of-1877. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 69.
178. Landmark Legislation: Civil Rights Act of 1875, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artand
history/history/common/generic/CivilRightsAct1875.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2022).
179. Id.
180. Sarah McCammon, The Story Behind 40 Acres and a Mule, NPR (Jan. 12, 2015),
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/01/12/376781165/the-story-behind-40-acres-and-a-mule.
181. Id.
182. DeNeen L. Brown, 40 Acres And A Mule: How The First Reparations for Slavery Ended in
Betrayal, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2021, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/04/15/40-acresmule-slavery-reparations/.
183. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 69; C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW
(1955).
184. BOSTON, supra note 168, at 22-26.
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them out of fields like law, accounting, and medicine, and subject to
vigilant violence; their children were excluded from public schools.185 In
response, Chinese Americans formed Chinatowns and ethnic economies
that were responsive to demand for personal services, such as laundry and
restaurants.186 “Self-employment offered an alternative to wage work
where customers rather than bosses or fellow workers decided who was
acceptable. . . ,” drawing the Chinese into businesses that had low capital
requirements and that could employ other co-ethnics.187
“Chinese Americans began to embrace self-employment even before
the Chinese Exclusion Act, but after the law’s passage self-employment
became the norm.”188 A parallel development could be seen in
Washington’s response to the declining political situation for Blacks after
the Civil War, including the overturning of the 1875 Civil Rights Act by
the Supreme Court: “Good school teachers and plenty of money to pay
them will be more potent in settling the race question than many civil
rights bills and investigating committees.”189
Black Americans were primarily confined to agricultural and domestic
work. According to economist Jay Mandle,
four mechanisms have been identified that tended to confine [B]lack
laborers to plantation work. Within the South, [B]lacks had little access to
land ownership, and industrial employment grew but slowly. Outside of
the South, discriminatory hiring practices probably worked to the detriment
of [B]lacks, and northern employers were legally discouraged from
recruiting [B]lack workers. Each of these tends to work in the same
direction: to deny southern [B]lacks access to alternative employment
opportunities to plantation labor.190

Blacks faced the same bleak conditions when they moved to urban areas.
Although the American Federation of Labor itself was against racial
discrimination, it succumbed to the racial exclusionary policies of local
unions which meant that more often than not, manufacturing jobs in cities
were not made available to Blacks.191
Political and economic exclusion, either by law or by social custom,
from the wider society meant many Blacks had no choice but to turn to
self-help measures, becoming entrepreneurs who catered mostly to

185. Susan B. Carter, Embracing Isolation: Chinese American Migration to Small-Town America,
1882-1943 4-6, 8 (2011) (unpublished draft), https://paa2012.princeton.edu/papers/121668.
186. Id. at 4-6.
187. Id. at 8.
188. Id. at 9.
189. BOSTON, supra note 168, at 3.
190. See generally JAY R. MANDLE, THE ROOTS OF BLACK POVERTY (1978); BOSTON, supra note
168, at 12.
191. See generally MANDLE, supra note 190; see also BOSTON, supra note 168, at 13.
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African American consumers. This stands in stark contrast to Black
businesses before the Civil War who operated in the “open market” of
New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia and Cleveland. 192In other words,
“[i]t was only after slavery that they slowly began to be forced to engage
in business strictly amongst themselves, ultimately limiting their revenues
and profits. Despite the obstacles, African Americans did form
businesses, mainly in urban locales where their market was largest.”193
Because Washington saw that “political participation alone, without a
solid economic foundation, left his race at the mercy of their enemies,” 194
he advocated an economic emphasis to make “African Americans an
economic force to be reckoned with. In his mind, he equated economic
power with true freedom and equality.”195
It is important to keep in mind that an examination of African
American entrepreneurship has to take into account not only slavery
but Jim Crow laws in the South and even segregation in the North after
the Civil War. Despite the tradition of Black entrepreneurship, albeit
restricted, as early as the 1700s, as discussed above, Black business
development became even more disadvantaged because “the complete
separation of the races was defined in concrete.” 196 In the words of the
governor of North Carolina after the Civil War,
[t]he law that separates you from the white people of the state socially
always has been and always will be inexorable, and it need not concern you
or me whether the law is violated elsewhere. It will never be violated in the
South. . . . [I]t is absolutely necessary that the race should remain distinct
and have a society of its own.197

This is in stark contrast to other ethnic groups who, despite facing
discrimination and exclusion, were allowed to have customers or
clientele from the mainstream society, as discussed further in the latter
part of this Section.
It is thus an utter conundrum that the record of African ethnic
economies has been sidelined in sociological entrepreneurship literature.
As noted by Margaret Levenstein who authored one of the most
comprehensive books about the history of African American businesses
in the United States,
One of the most striking findings of this study is that in 1910 AfricanAmericans were more likely than white Americans to be employers, and
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
(1941).

See supra notes 133-141 and accompanying text.
BOSTON, supra note 168, at 14.
Id. at 27.
Id.
BUTLER, supra note 30, at 153.
ARCHIBALD HENDERSON, NORTH CAROLINA: THE OLD NORTH STATE AND THE NEW 440-41
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almost as likely as whites to be self-employed. This contrasts with the
current period in which African-Americans are only a third as likely as
whites to work in their own businesses. This raises questions about claims
that African-American culture is unsupportive of entrepreneurial activity,
or that “ cultural differences may explain [B]lack white differentials in
self-employment.” If cultural differences are to explain the 20th century
differentials in self-employment, they must be a twentieth century
development.198

In other words, if African American rate of business ownership was
higher historically than it was in modern times such as the twentieth
century, then developments in the later years, rather than something more
intrinsic like African American culture, would explain the shift.199
Although not a scholar of the sociology of entrepreneurship,
Levenstein nevertheless understood the role networks play in economic
development. She observed that
[s]uccessful entrepreneurs often rely on networks for the provision of
information and resources which give them a competitive advantage privileged access to information about product markets, sources of labor or
capital, production technology, and management organization. Sometimes
these networks are based on family and extended kinship. Other networks
are based on common racial, ethnic, or religious identification. Historians
and sociologists have focused on these ‘non-economic’ networks to
explain ethnic and racial differences in patterns of entrepreneurship.200

There was a definite network of African American businesses which was
disrupted only by the migration up north. There was also a significant
proportion of African American men in agriculture and African American
women in services who were employers and self-employed respectively.
For both, “the proportions were higher than their white counterparts.” 201
Nonetheless, although African Americans were highly concentrated in
agriculture, Levenstein’s data also show that the number of African
Americans employers outside of agriculture was 19,000, double the
number estimated by Booker T. Washington.202
Moreover, Levenstein found that there was a vibrant African American
community in the South that supported the “buy [B]lack” movement

198. Margaret Levenstein, African-American Entrepreneurship: The View from the 1910 Census,
24 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 106, 107-08 (1995) (citations omitted) (quoting Bruce Meyer, Why Are There So
Few Black Entrepreneurs? 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 4791, 1994)).
199. “Fully 92% of all African-American male entrepreneurs, and over 97% of African American
male employers were in agriculture.” Id. at 109. One of the reasons the African American
entrepreneurship rate changes could very well be a result of the transition from an agricultural economy
to a more industrialized one, for example.
200. Id. at 106.
201. Id. at 109.
202. Id. at 107.
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which in turn led to “a considerable increase in the number of African
American businesses . . . .”203 Levenstein concluded that her findings
should cast doubt on claims “that African-American culture is
unsupportive of entrepreneurial activity, or that ‘cultural differences may
explain [B]lack white differentials in self-employment.’”204
Group consciousness exhibited by African Americans, especially
within the agricultural network, was also something that Washington
spent his life advocating, following the tradition of ethnic minorities
in the United States. 205 Interestingly, both ethnic immigrants and
Washington tend to reject individualism even in the age of laissez faire
capitalism. Washington was not alone in stressing racial solidarity. In
fact, African American leaders after Reconstruction were relatively
united in their belief in “self-help, racial solidarity, and looking inward
as opposed to placing emphasis on governmental or philanthropic
aid.”206 Rather than protesting in favor of political rights and against
wrongs and trying to get white liberals to join in the struggle, this
sentiment of self-help was reflected in a letter written to the editors of
a prominent newspaper in which the writer exhorted his group to
mimic the Jews.207 Washington himself urged that African Americans
emulate Jews in order to achieve economic success: “They had a
certain amount of unity, pride, and love of race; and, as the years go
on, they will be more and more influential in this country, a country
where they were once despised, and looked upon with scorn and
derision.”208
John Hope, the first African American President of Morehouse
College, wrote, “We must take in some, if not all, of the wages, turn it
into capital, hold it, increase it. This must be done as a means of
employment for the thousands who cannot get work from old sources.”209
Washington favored the conduct of business through the open market, not
only because such transactions would yield more profit, but also because
Blacks would have a greater opportunity to “display their worth to the
surrounding community of [B]lacks and whites.”210 He also saw the
benefits of a niche, that is, one that could be formed by seizing a specific
economic opportunity and excelling at it.211

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id. (quoting Meyer, supra note 198, at 26).
BOSTON, supra note 168, at 29.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 61, 141, 145.
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Like ethnic immigrants who relied on community associations, such as
the Chinese immigrants who established Chinese Benevolent
Associations all over the United States for self-help,212 Washington
formed the Negro Farmers’ Conference, an improvement association, to
encourage farmers to be free of debt, to purchase land, and to be
entrepreneurs. 213 Through the conference, farm families were brought to
the Tuskegee Institute for instructions on ways to improve farming and
home life through self-improvement, self-sufficiency, and agricultural
diversification.214 Washington’s purpose was “to find out the actual
industrial, moral, and educational condition of the masses” to assist “the
masses of the colored people to lift themselves.”215 Sessions were devoted
to issues that were crucial to the livelihood and wellbeing of the Black
farmers in the South, including those dealing with “owning and renting
land, living in one-room log cabins, mortgaging crops, paying debts,
educating children, and living a moral and religious life.”216 These
sessions could be described as consciousness-raising sessions where both
problems and success stories were shared, such as reports about “their
self-denial practices in order to buy land and livestock and to build
dwellings, schools and churches. They told how four or five years ago
they had mortgaged their crops, and then how they had gotten out of debt
and purchased land.”217 Farmers were taught how to avoid debt or urged
not to mortgage their crops for expenses that could be avoided, such as
luxury goods like clocks and pianos, or those that they could grow
themselves, like fruits and vegetables in order to free themselves from
tenant farming and achieve economic independence.218 For Washington,
his community self-help work was meant to aid Blacks “advance[] from
slavery to wage earner to tenant farmer to landowner and finally to
entrepreneur . . . .”219
Given the centrality of agriculture in the economic life of African
Americans in the South especially, African American leaders and
organizations emphasized Black agricultural development. For example,
the National Negro Business League (“NNBL”) which was founded by
Washington to encourage and support Black entrepreneurship, included a

212. Huiguan, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/huiguan (last visited Nov.
22, 2022); SUCHENG CHAN, ASIAN AMERICANS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 63-65 (1991).
213. BOSTON, supra note 168, at 76.
214. See generally Allen Jones, Improving Rural Life for Blacks: The Tuskegee Negro Farmers’
Conference, 1892-1915, 65 AGRIC. HIST. 105 (1991).
215. Id. at 107.
216. Id. at 107-08.
217. Id. at 111.
218. BOSTON, supra note 168, at 86-88.
219. Id. at 89.
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multitude of agricultural subjects at its 1911 national convention220; some
of the topics included “Raising and Shipping Fruits and Poultry,” the
“Pickle King,” and “My Success as a Horticulturist.”221 To ensure that
community self-help was accessible to as many as possible, Washington
took steps to bring agricultural techniques to the farmers themselves, by
sending agricultural agents with agricultural wagons to bring farming
equipment, milk separators, churners, information on soil building, stock
raising, and other farming operations to the farmers themselves.222 Local
conferences were also held. Many of the local conferences met monthly
“to spread the doctrine of rural uplift to neighboring [B]lack farmers and
to send delegates to the annual conference at Tuskegee each winter.” 223 A
local self-help conference held in 1898
resolved (1) that we make renewed efforts to accumulate property,
which . . . will inspire confidence not only in one another, but win that of
other races as well; (2) we condemn the mortgage system as practiced by
our people; (3) we strive to acquire land, and build houses of more than
one room; (4) we plant less cotton and more food products . . . ; (5) we
extend our school sessions by uniting our schools and taxing ourselves as
far as possible; (6) we greatly improve our school houses; (7) we employ
better teachers and preachers and pay them more; (8) to improve our
morals, we draw strict lines between good people and bad people and that
we denounce immorality in all, high or low; (9) we treat our women better;
(10) we use no whiskey; (11) we practice our religion in our everyday life
and have less strife in our churches; (12) we decide more of our differences
outside of courts.224

The result, according to scholars, was “real improvement in thrift, land
ownership, and self-respect for [B]lack farmers . . . .”225
Through the NNBL, Washington
[p]romoted his entrepreneurial ideas and values, telling delegates and
nondelegates to get practical education, to find an economic niche, to start
small in business and grow large, to pay the price of business success, to
put the attention of religious faith into their business activities, to learn all
they could within their occupations and never become complacent, to not
be afraid to take risks, and to pioneer businesses.226

220. The founding of the NNBL is a historically significant event. Before its establishment, African
American businesses could only seek help from ad hoc self-help organizations and did not have a
systematic, institutionalized national organization to help nurture their businesses. BUTLER, supra note
30, at 157.
221. Levenstein, supra note 198, at 114.
222. BOSTON, supra note 168, at 82.
223. Jones, supra note 214, at 112.
224. Id. at 112-13.
225. Id. at 113.
226. BOSTON, supra note 168, at 97; see also BUTLER, supra note 30, at 72.
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In one of his more well-known but contested speeches, Washington
passionately argued for group consciousness in business, with some
interpreting the speech to mean that Washington was in favor of separate
markets for Blacks, although others vehemently disagreed. As
Washington put it,
[e]xperience has shown, I believe, even in the North, that the largest
opportunities for the Negro in business are in providing for those needs of
other members of his race, which the white business man, either through
neglect, or lack of knowledge, has failed or been unable to provide. The
Negro knows the members of his own race. He knows the Negro people of
his neighborhood, in their church, and in their family life, and is able to
discriminate in his dealings with them. This superiority in the matter of
credits is in itself a business advantage, of which competition cannot easily
deprive the Negro, and one which, with the extension of the modern
methods of business, is likely to become of increasing importance.227

Whether this meant he was urging African Americans to cater only to
other African Americans is not important for the purpose of this article.
As noted in Section I, ethnic economies may mean consumers and owners
are co-ethnics, but that is not a necessary component of such economies.
Whether or not Washington called for Black businesses to operate in
an integrated, as opposed to segregated, market, other Black leaders were
comfortable with ethnic economies that were separate from the
mainstream market. At the 1904 NNBL Convention, when it became clear
that African American enterprises were faced with insurmountable
structural barriers – prohibition from operating in the open economy and
hence an inability to serve clients outside their own ethnic economies –
the NNBL began a concerted campaign to promote racial solidarity as a
necessity for success, requiring members to pledge support of businesses
owned by other African Americans.228 Fred Moore, one of the leaders of
the Negro Business League urged Blacks to support other Blacks.
Jews support Jews; Germans support Germans; Italians support Italians
until they get strong enough to compete with their brother in the
professions and trades; Negroes should now begin to support Negroes. . . .
The white man . . . would respect Negroes if they were organized in support
of each other and thus, demonstrated faith in the capacity of the race.
Instead of constantly appealing to whites, Negroes should create their own
opportunities.229

This call within the NNBL for a Black economy reinforced by racial
solidarity created controversy within the organization, as those who were

227. BOSTON, supra note 168, at 103.
228. AUGUST MEIER, NEGRO THOUGHT IN AMERICA: 1880–1915 114 (1966).
229. Id. at 125-26.
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dependent on white customers were opposed.230
One of the most serious barriers facing the establishment of the Black
ethnic economy is economic segregation enforced by law. In an ironic
twist, while ethnic economies are indeed established as a reaction to
hostility from the wider society, most are not forcibly and legally
segregated from it. In other words, ethnic entrepreneurs are not forced to
transact only with co-ethnics whereas “Afro-Americans, especially in the
period following the Civil War, were restricted by law from operating
their business enterprises in an open market.”231 Mehra Steven Stuart
noted the discrepancy in treatment African Americans had to endure
despite the group’s long and entwined history with the United States as
compared to the experience of more recent newcomers: Segregation
is an economic detour which no other racial group in this country is
required to travel. Any type of foreigner, Oriental or ‘what not,’ can usually
attract to his business a surviving degree of patronage of the native
American. No matter that he may be fresh from foreign shores with no
contribution to the national welfare of his credit; no matter that he sends
every dollar of his America-earned profit back to his foreign home and uses
it to help finance organizations dedicated to the destruction of the
government that furnishes him his new golden opportunity; yet he can find
a welcome place on the economic broadway to America. But the Negro,
despite centuries of unrequited toil to help build and maintain that highway,
must turn to a detour that leads he knows not where. Following this
doubtful economic trail, he knows that he will have to find most of his
customers within his own race in any enterprise he attempts.232

In a landmark book on African businesses, Joseph Pierce made a
similar observation about the unique nature of African American ethnic
economies.
Restricted patronage does not permit the enterprises owned and operated
by Negroes to capitalize on the recognized advantages of normal
commercial expansion. It tends to stifle business ingenuity and
imagination, because it limits the variety of needs and demands to those
of one racial group—a race that is kept in a lower bracket of purchasing
power largely because of this limitation. The practice of Negro business
in catering almost entirely to Negroes has contributed to the development
of an attitude that the Negro consumer is obligated, as a matter of racial
loyalty, to trade with enterprises owned and operated by Negroes.233

This phenomenon is in sharp contrast to the middleman minority
experience – the Chinese in Mississippi, the Jews in the South, and the
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 125-57.
BUTLER, supra note 30, at 77.
MEHRA STEVEN STUART, AN ECONOMIC DETOUR xxiii (1940).
PIERCE, supra note 163, at 31.
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Japanese all had ethnic economies that included non-co-ethnic
consumers.234 While it is true that middleman minorities did indeed face
outright hostility, “[h]ostility from the host society, which is so much a
part of the middleman theory, fades in comparison to being excluded from
the overall economic marketplace.”235 “[M]arketplace exclusion is the
most powerful form of hostility in which questions of racial and ethnic
discrimination are concerned.”236 Before the Civil War, when African
American businesses were not so hampered, they had a respectable record
of success.237 But the institution of segregation laws and the prevention
of Blacks from conducting business in the open market constitute
“interference of government into the normal operation of the
marketplace.”238 Moreover, African Americans were the only group to
which this policy of enforced market segregation applied.239 This is an
important historical fact to acknowledge, given the propensity for the
subtext – “if other immigrants succeed in business, why not Blacks?” Not
even the Japanese who did in fact face a high level of hostility and
discrimination were restricted from operating in the open market;
clientele for the Japanese ethnic economy came from white society.240 On
occasions when they were prohibited from transacting with those outside
their ethnic economies, they did not succeed.241
Washington’s emphasis on the belief that the “dollar is colorblind” may
be correct, but not when the open economy is racialized and designed to
exclude Black participation.242 It is also important to note that
Washington consciously set out to instill or facilitate an entrepreneurial
spirit among African Americans even though there was an absence of
middleman-type business tradition.243 He took some unorthodox steps for
the time that he was operating in, such as recognizing that women’s
advancement was a part of African American advancement. He
encouraged and nurtured women to become business owners who would
join the NNBL, many of whom became restaurant owners, caterers,
tailors, manicurists, and hairstylists.244 One of the most famous members
of the NNBL was Sarah Breedlove Walker, also known as Madame C. J.
Walker, a millionaire who developed hair products sold in the United
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

BUTLER, supra note 30, at 79.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 77.
Id.
BONACICH & MODELL, supra note 5, at 111.
Id. at 81.
BUTLER, supra note 30, at 77-78.
BOSTON, supra note 168, at 108.
Id. at 109-111.
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States and abroad.245
During the period of 1903 to 1913 when the NNBL was most active,
although causation can’t be proven, there was a 60% increase in Black
businesses – 15,000 additional businesses were formed; in 1900, 20,000
African American businesses existed compared with 65,000 in 1924.246
Between 1867 and 1917, the number of Afro-American businesses went
from 4,000 to 50,000, with the largest presence in restaurants and cafes
and lunchroom keepers; however, during this time period, unlike the
1700s, these restaurants could only serve African American clients.247
In 1904, Philip Payton, a member of the NNBL, founded the Afro
American Realty Company which rented Harlem properties mainly to
African Americans, creating one of the most cosmopolitan African
American communities in the United States in the process.248
Washington’s message of uplifting the Black race, racial solidarity, and
engaging in self-help had a salubrious impact on the influential Dr.
Ezekiel Nelson who exhorted the philosophy of cooperative economics to
improve the condition of African Americans in Buffalo; he believed that
they should work together, pool their resources and support cooperative
enterprises, which would also create jobs for Black youths.249 Others
inspired by the call for racial solidarity included Arthur Gaston, who
formed a life insurance company (the Booker T. Washington Burial
Insurance Company) serving African American clients; the Booker T.
Washington Business College that teaches business to African
Americans; a realty company that specialized in the Birmingham market;
a motel and restaurant that served Blacks victimized by Jim Crow laws;
and a bank for Blacks discriminated against by white banks.250Inspired by
Washington's entrepreneurial spirit,251 John Johnson founded “AfricanAmerican-owned and -operated publishing company in the world and
launched Ebony and Jet, two very successful magazines that gave a voice
to millions of black Americans.”252
Unfortunately, despite efforts to instill racial consciousness to
provide an extra boost to African American ethnic economies, for a
245. See supra note 154. See also Henry Louis Gates, Jr. Madame Walker, The First Black
American Woman To Be A Self-Made Millionaire, Pbs, at https://www.pbs.org/wnet/african-americansmany-rivers-to-cross/history/100-amazing-facts/madam-walker-the-first-black-american-woman-to-bea-self-made-millionaire/.
246. Id. at 112.
247. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 156-57.
248. BOSTON, supra note 168, at 131.
249. Id. at 132.
250. Id. at 134-35.
251. Id. at 136.
252. Encyclopedia of Arkansas, John Harold Johnson (1918-2005), at https://encyclopediaofarkan
sas.net/entries/john-harold-johnson-2354/.
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variety of reasons, “data revealed that Afro-American consumers
purchased most goods at white-owned stores. . . .” 253 An
overwhelming percentage of African American patronage was
directed towards grocery stores, clothing, shoes, furniture, hardware,
and household supply stores owned by whites, with the exception of
tailoring and servicing businesses, like cleaning and pressing services
with tailoring, perhaps “reflecting less competition from white
businesses.”254 According to a noted historian on African
American businesses, “[t]he variation in purchasing was explained
by quality of goods, proximity to home, good styles, courteous service,
and low prices.”255
In sum, there were multiple impediments to Black entrepreneurship,
most of which were structural (as opposed to cultural or lack of cultural
resources). First, as noted previously, in the early 1900s, African
Americans were highly concentrated in agriculture, and
the relative lack of entrepreneurial behavior . . . today may have little to do
with cultural attitudes toward risk-taking or the desire for the
independence, authority, and responsibility associated with owning one’s
own business. Rather, it may reflect the extreme concentration of AfricanAmerican’s [sic] entrepreneurial resources, and the networks of AfricanAmerican entrepreneurs, in a sector which was undergoing long term
decline.256

With respect to African American women, 74% of the entrepreneurs
and 87% of the self-employed were in the personal service sector; and
like African American men, the women were heavily concentrated in
agriculture, with 93% of African American female employers being in
agriculture. 257 Like immigrants excluded from opportunities in the wider
mainstream economy, African American women turned to the business
sectors where they had the necessary skill set and where they could seek
customers. Unfortunately, both the agriculture and service sectors were,
economically speaking, declining sectors, which in turn had a detrimental
impact on African American ethnic economies. 258
Second, given the continued, if not exacerbating, condition of
segregation, businesses owned by African Americans for the most part
ended up operating in a segregated as opposed to open market, whether
intentional or not. Increasingly Black entrepreneurs advocated a form of
Black nationalism through Black schools, organizations, buy Black
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

PIERCE, supra note 163, at 52-53.
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campaigns which created a parallel ethnic economy for Blacks not much
different from those operated by ethnic minority immigrants. 259 The idea
of a separate economy for Blacks – that is, an ethnic economy that not
only has Black owners and workers but also serves Black consumers
predominantly – gained momentum through the work of Marcus Garvey,
who, like Washington, pushed for self-reliance of the kind espoused by
the Protestant ethic, and that of Elijah Muhammed as leader of the Nation
of Islam.260 Muhammad’s philosophy, solidarity, is akin to the solidarity
that undergirded the ethnic economies of immigrants. Business by racial
outsiders needs business strategies and also strategies that unite the race
through a consciousness of solidarity and commonality of culture. As
Muhammed explained,
[i]t is a great job trying to change the so-called Negroes from the ways of
their slave masters and to unite them. It may take much suffering but I say
that it CAN be done. Islam will unite us all. . . . The religion of Islam makes
one think in terms of self and one’s own kind. Thus this kind of thinking
produces an industrious people who are self-independent.261

As some have observed, except for his adoption of Islam, Muhammed’s
strategy is similar to Washington’s, with its emphasis on self-help, Black
unity, hard work, self-reliance, and strategic avoidance of politics and
civil rights, which is in turn similar to the cultural values that animate
immigrant ethnic economies.262
Despite the economic detour forced upon African Americans, their
large numbers in the South and in some cities in the North nonetheless
allowed them, against all odds, to develop economic activities263 very
much in the middleman minority/ethnic economy trajectory of self-help
and ethnic solidarity discussed in Section I. The next Part examines
community institutions developed to engage in mutual self-help
throughout African American history in the United States.
B. Self-Help Institutions and African American Economic Enclaves
African Americans have been assiduous in organizing and establishing
an array of self-help institutions throughout the group’s history. Two of
the more important ones were the church and insurance companies. The
church has functioned as both a religious institution and a sanctuary of
self-help for African Americans. Slaves attended churches of their own

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

BOSTON, supra note 168, at 133 (2010).
Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 140.
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creation in secrecy and even used church meetings to organize
insurrections.264 Because churches were so foundational in the lives of
slaves, Blacks formed their own formal churches when they faced
discrimination within white ones.265 Despite hostility and threats from
white churches when African Americans established the African
Methodist Episcopal (“AME”) Church in the 1770s, the founders even
created a slogan “To Seek For Ourselves”266 in various campaigns to fight
slavery and nurture education, self-help, morality, and solidarity in the
Black community.267 The AME church developed a relationship with the
African American community, creating a Department of Extension from
church funds used to capitalize small businesses as well as fund higher
institutions of learning.268 Between 1847 and 1904, the church gave more
than one million dollars to educational efforts. It also had over a million
dollars in connectional or general operating funds. By 1907, with over a
million dollars in funds, the AME Church supported twenty-two
schools.269
Given the dearth of schools, for both Blacks and whites in the South,
white Northerners made the construction of a public school system one of
the major goals in the South during Reconstruction.270 Universal
education was not available and was not deemed a state function until
Reconstruction.271 There was tremendous attention placed on education
within the African American community, as noted by Dubois. Referring
to “Negroes,” Dubois stated,
They are not only supplementing the public funds and lengthening the
school term, but are establishing private schools and consolidating with the
public schools nearby; they are rebuilding independent private schools; and
they are supporting in larger measure the great schools established by
Northern philanthropy. One of the most conspicuous cases of consolidating
with the public school is furnished by the Keyesville Industrial School in
Charlotte Country [Virginia]. This is an industrial school, founded in 1898
and supported almost entirely by Negroes, through the Baptist
organizations of that neighborhood.272

The first African American lodge, Lightfoot Lodge No.1, dedicated to
community self-help and “employed in the work of uplifting the
264.
265.
(1973).
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 86; FOSTER, supra note 175, at 97-98 (1954).
KAPLAN SIDNEY, THE BLACK PRESENCE IN THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 81
Id. at 85.
MEIER, supra note 228, at 44-45.
BUTLER, supra note 30, at 90.
Id. at 93.
LOUIS R. HARLAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 3 (1969).
BUTLER, supra note 30, at 100.
W. E. B. DU BOIS, ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AMONG NEGRO AMERICANS 78-81 (1907)
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race . . . ,”273 was originally in Mississippi274 but grew into twenty-six
grand Lodges, 1,536 subordinate lodges consisting of almost 70,000
members and more than $200,000 in various treasuries. Many fraternal
and beneficial societies served Afro-Americans from the 1700s to early
1900s. 275 Although there were failures due to bad management or general
economic downturn, through these institutions, members learned finances
and
[t]he techniques of salesmanship and canvassing campaigns . . . . Indeed,
these organizations were the only places where leaders could come in
contact with very large sums of money. This experience helped them to
develop financial institutions in connection with some of the organizations.
The budding legal talent of the race was also utilized and given experience.
Given the amount of money involved, most of the organizations retained
lawyers. Perhaps more important, as a result of the millions of dollars
collected, thousands of young Afro-American families were helped in
getting an education, hundreds of homes were paid for, and mortgages were
satisfied in places where these societies operated.276

Although these societies succeeded in their purpose of “uplifting” the
race, they were not businesses but did, however, lay “the groundwork for
one of the first successful business enterprises among Afro-American
entrepreneurs—the insurance business.”277
The insurance business originated in Black churches in the North and
was part of the self-help apparatus that was established in the 1700s to
provide relief to African Americans struck by illness, family deaths, or
other tragedies. 278 The major benevolent societies of the 1800s were the
Free African Society, the New York Society, the Clarkson, the
Wilberforce Benevolent, the Union Society of Brooklyn and the
Woolman Society of Brooklyn. 279 As historians have noted, “As soon as
the colored man became free he formed all kinds of associations for
mutual protection, many of which exist today though in somewhat
modified forms. These organizations were founded for the purpose of
caring for the sick and furnishing decent burial at death.”280
In the South, after the Emancipation Proclamation, benevolent
societies from the North went South, and even with the establishment
of the governmental agency, the Freedmen’s Bureau, became, along
273. Id. at 122.
274. Id. at 121-22.
275. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 115.
276. Id. at __; see also STUART, supra note 232, at 12-13.
277. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 117.
278. Id.
279. STUART, supra note 232, at 4.
280. REPORT OF THE HAMPTON CONFERENCE NO. 8, 15-16, 18, in W. E. B. DU BOIS, ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION AMONG NEGRO AMERICANS 99 (1907).
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with the Black churches, one of the most influential and effective
institutions for Black mutual assistance. 281 Due to race discrimination
by white insurance companies, Black ones were formed, paying death
and sickness benefits to members. Their objective was generally to
raise a fund to be appropriated exclusively toward the support of such of
the members of said society as shall by reason of sickness or infirmity, or
either, be incapable of attending to their usual vocation or employment,
and also toward the relief of the widows and orphans of deceased
members.282

The first Black insurance company was founded in Philadelphia in
1810 and survived until its collapse in 1833. 283 After the Civil War,
segregation ironically helped African American insurance business
develop and thrive because given the dearth of opportunities in white
insurance companies, Blacks worked exclusively for Black-owned
companies.284 By 1937, there were more than 9,000 persons employed
by the industry;285 ten years later, the number of insurance companies
owned by African Americans exclusively was 211. 286 Indeed, African
American insurance enterprises even “came through the Depression in
much better economic shape than did the white companies.” 287
Besides insurance companies, banks were also an established presence
in the African American community. During the Civil War, the Free
Labor Bank was formed with the encouragement of the Union to help
African American troops deposit their pay. 288 Other such banks were
established in proximity to wherever Black soldiers were stationed. 289
After the war, the federal government formed the Freedmen’s Savings
and Trust Company with the following objective:
And be it further enacted, that the general business and object of the
corporation hereby created shall be received on deposit such sums of
money as may, from time to time, be offered therefore by or on behalf of
persons heretofore held in slavery in the United States, or their
descendants, and investing the same in the stocks, bonds, treasury notes or

281. STUART, supra note 232, at 7-8.
282. DU BOIS, supra note 272, at 96-97.
283. J. H. HARMON, JR., ARNETT G. LINDSAY & CARTER G. WOODSON, THE NEGRO AS A
BUSINESS MAN 97 (1929).
284. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 124.
285. STUART, supra note 232, at 49.
286. KINZER & SAGARIN, supra note 134, at 93.
287. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 131.
288. Partnership for Progress, Minority Banking Timeline, 1864 Free Labor Bank, at
https://www.fedpartnership.gov/minority-banking-timeline/free-labor-bank.
289. Id. at 135; WALTER L. FLEMING, THE FREEDMEN’S SAVINGS BANK 20 (1927).
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other securities of the United States.290

With branches mostly in Southern states, the Freedmen Bank served
recently freed Black slaves who deposited almost four million dollars,
demonstrating that Blacks not only understood the need to save but also
did manage to save to ensure economic stability; and had trust in
economic institutions such as banks.291 As a testament to Black ability to
save, records show that more than 70,000 African Americans deposited
their money with the bank and by 1874, deposits reached $55 million,
partly encouraged by the misperception that their money was backed by
the government.292 When the Freedmen Bank failed,293 African
Americans quickly began to set up their own private banking system. The
first bank opened in 1888 with an initial capitalization of $6,000 which
increased to $50,000 during its sixteen years of operation. 294 Many other
banks were subsequently established – in fact, no fewer than 134, not
including credit unions, industrial loan associations or loan societies,
were formed from 1888 to 1934 by African Americans.295 Even ethnic
groups that have been the focus of studies on entrepreneurship, such as
the Chinese, Japanese, and West Indians, do not have a record on
community banking that matches that of African Americans, perhaps
because no other group has been subject to an equivalent degree of market
exclusion and discrimination,296 making the relative omission of the
African American experience from this area even more confounding.
The NNBL, already discussed, can also be considered a self-help
institution.297 Because the national organization was aware of the need to
reach out to local groups, it sent a national organizer to local leagues to
help educate the latter on new business practices and business
promotion.298 The NNBL also promoted the National Negro Trade Week,
using existing media like newspapers and advertisements to promote
Black businesses to both white and Black customers.299 The organization
sought to facilitate and maintain connections among Black enterprises by
keeping a list of names and addresses of workers for hire, open
employment positions, businesses that are willing to hire African
290. DU BOIS, supra note 272, at 137.
291. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 135.
292. Id. at 136.
293. HARRIS, supra note 136, at 26-33, 38-39, 45 (discussing Bank and reasons for failure); DU
BOIS, supra note 272, at 137 (referring to Bank’s failure as one of the worst “disgraceful swindles
perpetrated on a struggling people”).
294. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 137.
295. Id. at 139; see also generally HARRIS, supra note 136.
296. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 149.
297. See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text.
298. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 160-62.
299. Id., at 161-62.
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Americans, and reports about League activities and achievements of
Black American businesspeople. 300
The achievement of the NNBL led to the creation of other self-help
institutions in specialized areas within the African American community,
such as the National Negro Press Association, the National Negro
Insurance Association, and the National Association of Bankers, with a
wide array of organizations following in their footsteps, such as the
Young Negro Cooperation League, the National Urban League, the
National Council of Negro Women and even fraternities and sororities
launching business-oriented events. 301
In a few instances, the proliferation of self-help institutions,
benevolent associations, and a concerted effort towards self-help and
racial solidarity did yield notably positive results. At the turn of the
century, African Americans, against all odds, did establish ethnic
enclaves such as that in Durham, North Carolina. As one commentator
observed about African American solidarity in Durham, referred to as
“The Wall Street of Negro America,”302 “[t]he increase in wealth, the
rise of institutions for public welfare, and the spirit of cooperation
have not been confined to one race. The progress of whites has been
accompanied by corresponding progress among the Negroes.”303
However, in 1898, Southern Democrats succeeded in disenfranchising
African Americans 304 who worked to establish “a business enterprise
community.”305 In addition, as discussed in the prior Section,
Durham’s success as a “racial enclave” 306 was hampered by “outside
economic and racial hostility”307 which kept African American
businesses from being able to serve white clients.
Durham began in 1852 as a tobacco city, given its siliceous soil which
made it ideal for tobacco growing.308 As the tobacco industry expanded,
African Americans migrated to Durham, first, renting land, then
purchasing from white owners, establishing churches including historical,
prominent ones like the White Rock Baptist Church, and building a
community known as Hayti.309 New factories were built, and the
development of Durham attracted other industries such as the textile
300. MONROE N. WORK, NEGRO YEAR BOOK, 1918–1919 at 132-33 (1919).
301. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 161-62.
302. E. Franklin Frazier, Durham: Capital of the Black Middle Class, in THE NEW NEGRO 333
(Winold Reiss ed., 1925).
303. WILLIAM KENNETH BOYD, THE STORY OF DURHAM 277 (1927).
304. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 177.
305. Id. at 179.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 179-80.
309. Id. at 179-80.
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industry which relied on African American workers for their textile mills.
Although there were African Americans in the skilled trades, their
numbers decreased after the abolition of slavery because they were
restricted from operating in the open market, a restriction exacerbated by
the decision of white labor unions to exclude African Americans from
such occupations.310 This exclusion forced African Americans to rely
only on other African Americans for business. Nonetheless, by 1940,
Hayti, a community in Durham, had become a thriving center of African
American business activities, with more than 150 well-established
businesses such as coffee houses, theaters, barber shops, boarding houses,
groceries, and funeral houses. 311 In addition, Durham was home to not
just small businesses but also major African American owned enterprises
including banks and insurance businesses.312
A myriad of reasons has been offered for the success of the city of
Durham as an African American business center. One was the support of
whites for Black enterprises, perhaps, as some scholars have surmised, as
an exchange for Black non-participation in politics. In a statement
opposing the governor’s racism from the Durham Morning Herald’s
editorial page: “If the Negro is going down, for God’s sake let it be
because of his own fault, and not because of our pushing him.”313 Some
scholars have observed that this was in fact the “deal” struck by Booker
T. Washington, “where he argued for white support of Afro-Americans
in business affairs—or in those things which would lead to mutual
progress—in exchange for the withdrawal of Afro-Americans from
politics.”314 Julian Shakespeare Carr, for example, an ex-Confederate
soldier, wealthy industrialist, white supremacist, and KKK member,
spoke favorably of Black businesses in the following way: “If we could
but succeed in weaning the Negro from believing that politics is their
calling by nature . . . and turn the bent of his mind into the development
of manufacturing industries, what will the end be? But if the Negro is to
continue to make politics his chief aim . . . there can be but one
ending.”315 To maintain the segregation of Blacks and whites, Carr
established an all-Black cotton mill and supported a Black-owned one,
sending his white workers to help African American businesses when

310. Id. at 181; see also Hugh Penn Brinton, The Negro in Durham: A Study of Adjustment to
Town Life 141 (1930) (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on file with
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
311. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 185
312. Id.; Frazier, supra note 302, at 333-34; WALTER B. WEARE, BLACK BUSINESS IN THE NEW
SOUTH: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE NORTH CAROLINA MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 4-5 (1973).
313. BOYD, supra note 303, at 279.
314. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 187; WEARE, supra note 312, at 39-42.
315. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 187.
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needed. 316
Another reason was that Durham did not have the kind of history or
“pedigree” of white aristocracy that other Southern cities such as
Charleston or New Orleans had. As a result, as a city of the post-bellum
South, it could forge forward with a different image. Moreover, Durham
was not plagued by internal cleavages that had created divisions within
the African American community. Durham avoided for the most part
[t]he invidious distinctions between “new issue” and “old issue,” house
servant and field hand, light and dark, [which] had given the Negro
society internal restraints to entrepreneurial activity based on racial
solidarity. At the turn of the century increasing segregation, discrimination,
and urbanization encouraged the rise of a [B]lack business class which
threatened to reorder the Negro status system that had been determined
by antebellum forces. Obviously the conflict would be less in cities
without an entrenched antebellum social order. Durham thus escaped part
of this institutional drag on its [B]lack economy. . . .The kind of
ideological conflict that found the colored gentry resisting the [B[lack
capitalist had little meaning in Durham, where wealth and status
coincided.317

Durham was also unusual in that many African American
entrepreneurs were able to tap into the open economy and do business
with white customers and clients. Consequently,
[a] common feature of the Negro business interests of Durham is the fact
that not one of their group organizations failed during the period of
depression. Such an achievement may well be considered a tribute to the
spirit of cooperation that prevails, as well as a tribute to the sound advice
and financial facilities that the Mechanics and Farmers Bank has been able
to place at the disposal of its patrons.318

As this Section has shown, there has been a long history of African
American entrepreneurship since the formation of the American colonies
which makes statements about the absence of such entrepreneurship a
strange conundrum indeed. In their landmark book, Glazer and Moynihan
made the curiously false observation that there was an “almost complete
absence of a business class which could provide jobs to fellow ethnics and
an avenue for social mobility;”319 and that this “failure of the Negro to
develop an entrepreneurial class”320 was one that Black leaders like
Washington despaired over. According to Glazer and Moynihan, the
316. Id.
317. WEARE, supra note 312, at 42-43.
318. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 193.
319. NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT: THE NEGROES, PUERTO
RICANS, JEWS, ITALIANS, AND IRISH OF NEW YORK CITY 30 (1963).
320. Id. at 32.
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“failure of the Negro to achieve success as a businessman”321 is due to an
absence of finance, skill, and ethnic or racial solidarity. 322 This Section
has shown that African Americans have strived to establish their own
ethnic economies and despite structural barriers faced by no other
immigrant group, have succeeded on many occasions by following an
economic path similar to that forged by immigrants – creating and
accessing cultural resources for economic self-help.323 The issue is not
that Blacks lack the cultural foundation needed to launch ethnic
economies. It is, rather, that ethnic economies have been established at
all, against such overwhelming odds.
CONCLUSION
The sociology on ethnic economies has focused on the historically
well-known middleman minorities phenomenon as well as on immigrantowned businesses in developed countries such as the United States.
Despite theoretical differences between the two areas, both share certain
commonalities – the existence of an “out” group that is excluded from the
mainstream, that faces hostility and prejudice generally and is relegated
to the secondary labor force particularly, and hence, an entrenched
demarcation and separateness between insiders versus outsiders. In
response, the outgroup marshals and leverages its group solidarity, using
cultural resources to create a market or economy for group members.
Surprisingly, much of the literature has excluded the experience of
African Americans, even though African Americans fit the classic model
that partly – the development of ethnic economies – separateness,
exclusion, and hostility. The subtext that provides a reasonable
explanation for this gap is that the second crucial component of ethnic
economies – cultural resources and group cohesion – is lacking in the
African American community. African Americans have failed to do what
middlemen minorities and immigrants have done, forging a common
identity and using it and group cultural capital to benefit the group. These
assumptions about African American “failures” have been reinforced by
reports of West Indian and African immigrant successes.
Despite tremendous barriers faced by no other immigrant group to the
321. IVAN LIGHT, ETHNIC ENTERPRISE IN AMERICA: BUSINESS AND WELFARE AMONG CHINESE,
JAPANESE AND BLACKS 21 (1972).
322. GLAZER & MOYNIHAN, supra note 319, at 33.
323. Looking at the present and into the future, one might also observe that the African American
music industry can itself by seen as an ethnic economy that is thriving and successful, consisting of
distinctly cultural goods, especially within the rap industry “based around networks of entrepreneurs. They
are doing so . . . like other ethnic groups before them, through their ability to monopolize specialized
cultural goods” which include not just rap but also “graffiti graphics, fashion, and style.” Basu & Werbner,
supra note 4, at 239, 244.
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United States, African Americans have in fact had a long history of
forming their own ethnic economies sharing characteristics similar to
those characteristics identified in the ethnic economy literature. Black
leaders such as Booker T. Washington have consciously utilized the
strategy of establishing a Black market, as immigrants have in
establishing ethnic economies, as a means for promoting Black progress.
Although these strategies are well-known, perhaps by historians, they
have not been translated into the sociology or law and development
debate. This article is one step in this process.
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